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Racial slurs are terms that disparage individuals on the basis of their racial group. Interestingly, 
racial slurs are often reappropriated and used among the targeted group as a means of affiliation 
rather than derogation (subversive use; Bianchi, 2014). The current studies examined majority 
group members’ resistance to affiliative slur use. Previous research has shown (correlationally) 
that majority group members higher in socially dominant attitudes perceived a Black individual 
using “nigga” affiliatively toward a White person as threatening, and this threat was related to 
more negative perceptions of the reappropriated slur use and greater perceptions that prejudice 
toward Black individuals is justified (O’Dea & Saucier, revision in preparation). Extending this 
work, the current studies causally examined these effects by testing whether a high threat prime 
from Black individuals was associated with more negative attitudes toward a Black individual 
using a reappropriated term (i.e., “nigga”) affiliatively toward a White individual (Study 1) and 
toward another Black individual (Study 2), compared to a low threat condition or to a control 
condition. Further, the current studies examined whether participants’ existing socially dominant 
beliefs interacted with threat condition (high threat, low threat, control) in predicting their 
perceptions of reappropriated racial slur use. Consistent with my hierarchy defense hypothesis, 
the current findings showed that greater socially dominant attitudes were associated with more 
negative perceptions of “nigga” used affiliatively by a Black individual toward a White 
individual (Study 1) but not by a Black individual toward a Black individual (Study 2) which 
supported my competing hypothesis that intragroup uses of reappropriated racial slurs are not 
perceived as threatening. These relationships were largely unaffected by threat condition in 
either study. Further, while people higher in socially dominant attitudes were shown to be more 
resistant to intragroup uses of racial slurs, people across the spectrum of social dominance did 
  
not perceive slur reappropriation very negatively in either intergroup (Study 1) or intragroup 
(Study 2) uses. These findings extend previous research on the subversive perspective (Bianchi, 
2014). Indeed, slur reappropriation may have a prosocial benefit of helping marginalized groups 
cope with prejudice (Galinsky et al., 2013) and may even be used to affiliate between groups. 
However, when used to bridge group boundaries, it may moderately increase highly socially 
dominant White peoples’ negative perceptions of slur reappropriation and their subsequent 
perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is acceptable.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
“Many Black folks do not advocate and refuse to use the word. That is 
their prerogative, it is their choice. They are selected members of that group and 
have freely chosen to not mention a word heavily used within that group. The best 
analogy I could think of is like a frequent flyer with Delta Airlines being invited 
into their First-Class lounge before takeoff but declines because she would rather 
be with her husband and kid who cannot get into the lounge because they only 
have Economy tickets. The woman is still a part of the frequent flyer group but 
simply didn’t want to take part in the First-Class lounge activities. This doesn’t 
mean she isn’t a frequent flyer and it doesn’t mean that she will continue to reject 
offers, it simply means that right now she has chosen not to participate.”  
 The above is a quote from Marcus Donaldson in a written piece on Medium.com 
(Donaldson, 2017). What Donaldson is describing is a reality for many Black Americans who 
choose to use or not use the term “nigger(a)”. Indeed, “nigger” is a term entangled in the history 
of discrimination against Black people in the United States. Amid this historical discrimination, 
many Black individuals reappropriated the use of “nigger.” However, the ending of the term was 
changed to “nigga”. This was done to cope with racial prejudice and to mock White individuals 
who were exhibiting discrimination in a way that was non-threatening. Specifically, although 
“nigger” and “nigga” are not true homonyms, the sounds of each of these terms in casual speech 
is so close that White people assumed that if a Black person used the term “nigga”, he or she was 
referring to him- or herself colloquially using the socially acceptable (at the time), “nigger.” 
Thus, there was little backlash for Black individuals and Rappoport (2005) describes this 
reclamation of historically derogative language as functioning as an inoculation against 
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discrimination (see Rappoport, 2005), making Black people less likely to respond aggressively or 
emotionally when they were targeted by the term by a White person (something that had 
extremely negative, and often violent, consequences; see Kendi, 2016). Societal norms have 
shifted in recent decades toward more intolerance of racial and other forms of group-based 
prejudice. As such, the derogative use of racial slurs has decreased, and their use is perceived 
negatively (O’Dea, Miller, Andres, Ray, Till, & Saucier, 2015).  
That said, Black individuals (and other minority groups) continue to have to cope with 
prejudice and, while existing literature describes slur reappropriation as slurs being used as terms 
of endearment rather than derogation, there is less of a societal consensus on the reappropriative 
use of racial slurs (e.g., “nigga” by Black individuals). Even more important is the lack of 
empirical work testing perceptions of reappropriated racial slurs. Indeed, while these 
reappropriative uses are arguably more societally acceptable in modern society than the 
derogative use of “nigger” by outgroup members (i.e., a White individual using “nigger” toward 
a Black individual derogatively), these reappropriative uses are contentious among Black 
individuals, and are also perceived as controversial by White individuals (see O’Dea & Saucier, 
revision in preparation).  
Extending these findings, the goal of the current studies is to further examine majority 
group members’ resistance to reappropriative racial slur use. Previous research has shown 
correlationally that White individuals higher in racial prejudice experience more threat 
(specifically threat perceptions that the use of the slur is to subvert and challenge their position in 
the status hierarchy) following a Black individual using “nigga” reappropriatively toward them 
(O’Dea & Saucier, revision in preparation). Further, this threat is related to greater perceptions 
that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified. The current studies will examine these 
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effects causally by examining whether participants’ levels of prejudice interact with a 
manipulated threat condition (high threat, low threat, or control prime) to predict White 
individuals’ perceptions of racial slurs and the extent to which participants perceive prejudice 
toward Black individuals as justified. Consistent with previous research, it was predicted that 
participants’ levels of prejudice would interact with threat condition such that higher levels of 
prejudice would be associated with more negative perceptions of “nigga” used by a Black 
individual toward a White target (Study 1) when participants are primed with high threat. 
However, when primed with low threat, it was predicted that participants’ levels of SDO would 
be either unrelated or negatively related to perceptions of reappropriated slur use by a Black 
individual toward a White individual (Study 1). There are competing hypotheses about White 
individuals’ perceptions of reappropriated slur use by a Black individual toward another Black 
individual. On one hand, White people may perceive reappropriative slur use as a coping 
strategy, which presumably will have less of an impact on the minority group’s status. As such, 
this should be less threatening to majority group members’ status position and socially dominant 
attitudes should either be unrelated or negatively related to perceptions of the reappropriative 
slur use as negative and as a justification for prejudice toward Black people. On the other hand, 
White people may perceive this slur use as subversive (i.e., being used by Black people to raise 
their own position in the status hierarchy). If this is the case, higher socially dominant attitudes 
should be associated with significantly more negative perceptions of the slur and greater 
perceptions that prejudice toward Black people is justified.  
 The Social Functions of Racial Slurs 
 Slurs (e.g., “nigger”) are terms that disparage individuals perceived to be an outgroup on 
the basis of their membership in an ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, gender, sex, or 
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other social group (Archer, 2015; Blakemore, 2014; Henderson, 2003; Henry, Butler, & Brandt, 
2014; Leets, 2003; Spotorno & Bianchi, 2015; Vallee, 2014). There are multiple debates in the 
literature about what slurs are, how they function, and what properties of slurs give them power. 
While the extant discussion of slurs describes slurs as being proportionally more offensive than 
non-group-based derogative terms, there is little consensus about what, specifically, gives slurs 
their power. 
One debate discusses the semantic versus pragmatic meaning of slurs. When discussing 
the derogative power of slurs, researchers have examined the semantic properties of racial slurs 
compared to other derogative terms and non-derogative terms. Interestingly, there have been 
highly contentious debates about how racial slurs should be represented in speech. For example, 
until relatively recently, “nigger” was described in the dictionary as a “Black person” (Himma, 
2002). Unfortunately, this definition makes it semantically impossible for someone to be Black 
without being a “nigger”, thereby endorsing the label (Himma, 2002). As social issues have 
become more at the forefront of public discourse, researchers have begun to examine the 
differences between racial slurs, racial descriptors, and non-racial derogative terms (see Archer, 
2015; Croom, 2008, 2011, 2014; Henderson, 2003; Henry, Butler, & Brandt, 2014; Hom, 2008; 
Kremin, 2017; Leets, 2003; Spotorno & Bianchi, 2015; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Diermeier, 2015).  
Researchers have identified differences between these categories in that racial descriptors 
(e.g., “Black”) describe the race or ethnicity of the target but do so in a non-disparaging way 
unless used as a race-marking tool in an instance of derogation. Non-group-based derogatives 
(e.g., “asshole”) generally only derogate the targeted individual(s) unless paired with a group-
based descriptive term (see O’Dea, Smith, & Saucier, in preparation). For example, non-group-
based derogative terms indicate that the target of the slur is despicable and can have negative 
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impacts on the target (e.g., lower self-esteem). Croom (2011) describes how racial slurs differ 
from non-racial derogatives and group-based descriptive terms because they possess both 
descriptive and derogative components. Thus, rather than indicating that the target is individually 
and idiosyncratically despicable (e.g., “asshole”), Croom notes that a racial slur indicates that the 
target is despicable because of a characteristic of themselves that cannot be changed (i.e., their 
race), and thus the derogation extends beyond the targeted individual to the broader social group. 
Interestingly, while this debate suggests what makes slurs unique from non-group-based 
derogative terms, this debate does little to incorporate the historical context of racial slurs or the 
effects that situational factors may have on perceptions of slurs.  
Some researchers advocate that the power of slurs comes from the historical context in 
which they were used and contend this historical context has become woven into the literal 
meaning of the term in ways that cannot be undone, independent of how the slurs are used 
(Anderson & Lepore, 2013). Although no researchers contend the historical context of slurs does 
not affect perceptions of slurs in contemporary society, in recent years there is a growing body of 
empirical work that suggests that the offensiveness of slurs is not entirely limited to the semantic 
meaning of the terms or the historical context of the terms independent of one another. For 
example, previous research has examined perceptions of racial slurs used between friends versus 
between strangers and found that slurs used between friends are perceived as substantially less 
offensive than racial slurs used between strangers (O’Dea et al., 2015). Although perhaps not a 
surprising finding, these results indicate that the perceived offensiveness of racial slurs is 
situationally and contextually dependent, and these findings have consistently replicated in a 
variety of situations and using a variety of slurs (e.g., O’Dea & Saucier, 2016). Further 
supporting the idea that racial slur offensiveness extends beyond historical contexts of the slur, 
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recent researchers paired racially descriptive terms (e.g., “Black”) with non-racial derogative 
terms (e.g., “motherfucker”), and compared perceptions of these terms in combination (e.g., 
“Black motherfucker”) to traditional derogative slurs (e.g., “nigger”; O’Dea, Smith, & Saucier, 
in preparation). These findings showed that, while previous researchers have discussed the 
importance of the historical context of slurs, there were small or non-significant differences in 
how offensive and negatively expressive the combination terms versus the traditional racial slurs 
were perceived to be (O’Dea et al., in preparation). Thus, it appears that while the historical 
denigration of a group is what likely creates and reinforces the negative stereotypes, the negative 
associations, and the social hierarchies between groups, the collective derogation that comes with 
the pairing of group-based descriptors with non-group-based derogative terms evoke stereotypic 
thinking similar to that evoked by historical racial slurs. Thus, it appears that the very properties 
of racial slurs being used to both express negative emotion toward the target as well as to 
describe the target are what continue to reinforce the power of racial slurs in contemporary 
society.  
 Negative Effects of Racial Slurs 
Taken together, racial slurs possess what Croom (2011, 2014) labels as a conceptual 
anchor. While some researchers (e.g., Hedger, 2012; Hedger, 2013) suggest that racial slurs do 
not function as descriptors in modern society, instead solely functioning as negative expressives; 
Croom contends that the descriptive component of slurs is not lost, but instead may be precisely 
what gives slurs their power. This is what allows racial slurs to not just be extremely damaging 
to individual targets, but also to the entire targeted group. Thus, racial slurs condemn the 
individual, the group, and, more importantly, indicate that future condemnation is likely to 
continue because the reason for condemnation (i.e., one’s race) cannot be changed (e.g., Citron, 
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Chein, & Harding, 1950; Graumann, 1998). There are several theories that explain why racial 
slurs have been, and continue to be, used. However, perhaps the simplest explanations are 
present in social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and the self-esteem hypothesis (see 
Abrams & Hogg, 1988).  
Social dominance theory explains that discrimination is intended to reinforce and 
maintain existing hierarchies that people find important (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Groups at the 
top of this social hierarchy enjoy benefits that lower status groups do not. Further, people higher 
in support of existing status hierarchies endorse legitimizing myths that reinforce the idea that 
social groups atop the status hierarchy attained that status by merit rather than some other 
arbitrary categorization (for additional information on status hierarchy legitimization see system 
justification theory; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). By justifying the use of racial slurs, majority 
group members delegitimize the societal advancement of lower status groups, thereby 
reinforcing existing status hierarchies.  
Similarly, the self-esteem hypothesis predicts that majority groups discriminate more 
when they feel that their collective self-esteem is in jeopardy, and this discrimination gives a 
boost to their collective self-esteem (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hunter, O’Brien, & Stringer, 
2007). Showing support for this theory, research has shown that people experience threat if they 
feel that their group’s status or collective self-esteem is in jeopardy (Aberson & Gaffney, 2008; 
Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Gonsalkorale, 
Carlisle, von Hippel, 2007). By reestablishing social control via the use of racial slurs or other 
hierarchy enhancing forms of discrimination/derogation, majority group members may be able to 
maintain or reestablish collective self-esteem (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Fritsche & 
Jugert, 2017; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).  
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Taken together, these theories suggest that racial slurs may be used to assert dominance 
over other racial groups (e.g., Blakemore, 2015; Embrick & Henricks, 2013; Gabriel, 1998; 
Henry et al., 2014; Kraus, Horberg, Goetz, & Keltner, 2011; Mullen, 2001; Mullen, Rozell, & 
Johnson, 2001; Palmore, 1962) and may have extreme negative impacts for individuals and 
groups targeted by the slur. For example, targets of racial slurs experience extreme emotional 
reactions (Brandt & Henry, 2012; Kremin, 2017; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & 
Pietrzak, 2002; Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2002); negative perceptions and stereotypes 
about their group are primed (Jeshion, 2013; Merskin, 2010); feel devalued (Kremin, 2017); and 
experience dehumanization (Graumann, 1998; Haslam, Loughnan, & Sun, 2011; Henderson, 
2003; Dodson, 2014).  
These slurs can also have longer-term negative impacts on targets of the slur. For 
example, these slurs bring negative perceptions and stereotypes to mind both in observers of the 
slur and individuals targeted by the slur (Jeshion, 2013; Merskin, 2010). This can lead to 
individuals who are targeted by racial slurs to attempt to overcome these negative stereotypes, 
which can have many negative effects in situations such as in educational settings and the 
workplace (see stereotype threat theory; Steele, 1997). Although somewhat criticized in recent 
years, stereotype threat theory combines literatures on social facilitation and stereotypes to 
describe a pattern of effects that can be extremely damaging to individuals belonging to a variety 
of groups. Specifically, when negative stereotypes about one or more of an individuals’ 
perceived ingroup(s) are made salient, individuals often fear confirming the negative stereotype. 
This may put additional stress onto the individual which can decrease performance on more 
difficult tasks (see social facilitation; Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Zajonc, 1965) such as those 
that may be performed in the workplace. Thus, if a racial slur targets a member of a minority 
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racial group in the workplace, the targeted individual may experience stressors due to fear of 
confirming the aroused negative stereotypes, which may inhibit performance and cause observers 
to make fundamental attribution errors by attributing that failure to personal attributes rather than 
seeing it as a product of discrimination. Research has empirically supported this process by 
showing that individuals who are targeted by racial slurs attain lower workplace advancement, 
report lower job satisfaction, and receive more negative evaluations of targeted individuals in the 
workplace (Gabriel, 1998; Greenberg & Pyszcynski, 1985; Henry, 2011).  
Each of the above effects can also lead to more lasting negative outcomes in individuals 
targeted by slurs, including negative health concerns (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 
2002). For example, experiences of discrimination are associated with increased heartrate and 
blood pressure (e.g., Krieger & Sidney, 1996). These connections may be due to experienced 
stress from the negative emotions discussed above, but may also be due to physical fears such as 
interpersonal violence, as research has shown racial slurs are thought of as the defining feature of 
a hate crime (e.g., Saucier, Hockett, & Wallenberg, 2008). Further, racial discrimination is 
associated with greater likelihood of engaging in negative health behaviors (e.g., smoking, 
alcohol dependence; Ladrine & Klonoff, 2000; Taylor & Williams, 2003). Studies have even 
suggested that these negative health behaviors (e.g., smoking) are potentially ways that 
individuals choose to cope with discrimination (Ladrine & Klonoff, 2000; Mays, Cochran, & 
Barnes, 2007). Admittedly, the effects discussed in this paragraph are related to Black 
individuals’ experiences with discrimination in a context wider than the use of racial slurs. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that being targeted by racial slurs functions similarly to other 
overt forms of discrimination.   
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 Reducing the Use and Negative Impacts of Racial Slurs 
Research examining how to reduce the use or negative impacts of racial slurs is important 
to reduce or remove the negative outcomes discussed above. In recent decades, society has 
shifted from greater allowance of overt forms of prejudice, including the use of racial slurs, 
toward greater intolerance of overt forms of prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000, Dovidio, 
Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, Hardee, & 
Batts, 1981; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 
2003; Sydell & Nelson, 2000). This has led racial slur use in modern society to be taboo, 
surprising, easily remembered, and salient (Jay, Caldwell-Harris, & King, 2008; Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003) due to the extremity of racial slurs (Holt, 2018; Jeshion, 2013) and the persistence 
of racial slurs despite societal norms that vilify their use. As linguistic and social psychological 
researchers have attempted to reduce the use and negative impacts of racial slurs further, two 
competing perspectives have emerged.  
Some authors suggest what I have labeled as a prohibitive perspective, asserting that 
slurs, regardless of circumstance, should never be expressed (see Anderson & Lepore, 2003). 
The prohibitive perspective asserts that the best way to get rid of slurs is to vilify all uses of slurs 
under any circumstances (Anderson & Lepore, 2013). Whether being used in a positively 
expressive way to affiliate, in a negative way to derogate, or as a descriptor meant to indicate 
someone’s ethnicity, this perspective asserts all uses of racial slurs are inappropriate and should 
be vilified. This norm contends that the offensiveness of a slur is part of the inherent semantic 
meaning; the negativity cannot be disentangled from its use. Anderson and Lepore (2013) 
propose that “slurs are prohibited words; and as such, their uses are offensive to whomever these 
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prohibitions matter” (p. 43). Thus, Anderson and Lepore (2013) contend that racial slurs should 
not be used in any situation for any reason.  
However, other researchers (e.g., Bianchi, 2014; Spotorno & Bianchi, 2015) suggest an 
echoic perspective in which social groups reappropriate and use slurs positively, in direct 
contradiction to their original meaning, as a way to subvert status hierarchies (e.g., the prosocial 
use of “nigga” among Black Americans). That said, the term echoic is not an ideal term. To echo 
something means to repeat or parallel (dictionary.com). Thus, proposing an echoic perspective 
implies that one is simply repeating the term in the same context. On the contrary, Bianchi 
(2014) describes this perspective as being subversive and in contradiction to the original 
meaning of the term. Therefore, this perspective should be relabeled to the subversive 
perspective to more accurately describe the phenomenon with implications that reappropriated 
slurs are used defensively and offensively to counter the negative effects of the terms when used 
disparagingly, and this terminology will be used throughout the current dissertation. Rappoport 
(2005) describes the affiliative use of slurs (including in humor) as a shield to cope with and 
defend against prejudice, functioning as an inoculation. This use of slurs passes along a shared 
cultural heritage in minority group members’ past and current battles against discrimination 
(Imoagene, 2015; King & Clarke, 2002; Motley & Craig-Henderson, 2007), creates ingroup 
bonds, and subverts existing status hierarchies (Cupkovic, 2014; Jacobs, 2002) by reclaiming a 
divisive tool used by racists against minority groups to reinforce status hierarchies. That said, 
reappropriative uses of slurs, similarly to the derogative uses of racial slurs, have created tension. 
The affiliative use of “nigga” is contentious among the Black community with some people 
supporting, and some people discouraging, its use (e.g., Dodson, 2014; King & Clarke, 2002; 
Motley & Craig-Henderson, 2007).  
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Each proposed norm (prohibitive and subversive) contends that the derogative use of 
slurs should be vilified in all circumstances. However, the two proposed norms diverge in their 
endorsement of slur reappropriation, (i.e., the use of slurs among the group they were once meant 
to target as a means of affiliation and group bonding).  Specifically, the prohibitive norm vilifies 
these utterances whereas the subversive norm encourages them. Importantly, very little research 
has empirically tested the validity of the two competing perspectives. The effectiveness of the 
subversive norm has received some empirical support:  Galinsky and colleagues (2013) found 
that marginalized group members who use reappropriated slurs feel more in control over the slur 
and report greater perceptions of ingroup power and self-power (Galinsky et al., 2013). Further, 
some research has shown that majority group members evaluated direct racist speech (i.e., racial 
slurs) as more harmful than did minority group members (Leets, 2003). Leets (2003) contends 
this effect may be due to desensitization on the part of minority group members as well as 
possible guilt and an overestimation/overreaction to the racist speech by majority group members 
which could theoretically be a result of White individuals attempting to show how non-racist 
they are (Goff, Steel, & Davies, 2008). That said, for reasons discussed below, while many 
majority group members may be supportive of reappropriative slur use, certain others majority 
group members may perceive the reappropriative slur use as being done to advance the status 
position of minority group members. 
 Antecedents of Intergroup Threat 
 There is a wealth of research examining predictors, correlates, and intergroup behaviors 
associated with intergroup threat that may help explain perceptions by majority group members 
of reappropriated racial slur use. Broadly, according to social dominance theory (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999), groups experience threat when they fear their position in the status hierarchy is 
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vulnerable (e.g., Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003). Majority group members fear that 
when outgroups advance, they will be competing with more people for what they perceive to be 
limited resources (see Conservation of Resources Theory; Hobfoll, 1989; and Instrumental 
Model of Group Conflict, Esses et al., 1998). More specifically, researchers have shown that the 
increase of outgroup size, or perceptions that outgroup size is increasing, can directly influence 
threat due to fears of greater diversity/multiculturalism (Alba, Rumbaut, & Barotz, 2005; 
Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Craig, Rucker, & Richeson, 2018; Herda, 2010; Hogg, 2016; Jost 
& van der Toorn, 2012; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012; Pettigrew, Wagner, & Christ, 
2010; Putnam, 2007; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Semyonov, Raijman, Yom Tov, & 
Schmidt, 2004; Skinner & Cheadle, 2016; Zou & Cheryan, 2017). When majority group 
members fear that their group is getting comparatively smaller than minority outgroups, they fear 
that their social influence may be taken away.  
That said, the effects of perceived group size on experiences of threat are also dependent 
on other factors. For example, these effects are diminished in people who have a lower national 
identity, but are heightened for people who have a higher national identity (e.g., Falomir-
Pichastor & Federic, 2013) or higher ingroup identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998; Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & 
Matz, 2004; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Doosje, Spears, Ellemers, & Koomen, 1999; 
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Falomir-Pichastor, & 
Frederic, 2013; Falomir, Gabarrot, & Mugny, 2009; Gabarrot, Falomir, & Mugny, 2009; 
Hutchinson, Jetten, Christian, & Haycraft, 2006; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Jetten, 
Spears, & Manstead, 1996; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Simon & Klandersmans, 2001; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Voci, 2006; Wohl, Giguere, Branscombe, & McVicar, 2011). The effect of 
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outgroup size can also be affected by salience, perceived control, and proximity (Enos, 2016; 
Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Giles & Evans, 1986; Pettigrew, 1959; Taylor, 1998). Specifically, 
when group differences or group sizes are made salient, threat from these groups is heightened 
(Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Sigelman & Niemi, 2001). When majority group members do 
not feel in control, they also experience threat (e.g., Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2014).  
Negative contact with outgroups can heighten the negative effects of proximity, salience, 
control, and group size on threat and prejudice toward outgroups (Aberson & Gaffney, 2008; 
Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; McManus, 
Saucier, O’Dea, & Bernard, revision under review). Specifically, if interactions (in person or 
through social media) with outgroup members result in greater perceived danger or greater 
perceptions that outgroups are trying to change existing values and norms, perceived threat is 
increased. That said, consistent with the contact hypothesis, if these interactions are positive, 
perceived threat is lessened (see Hall & Krysan, 2016; MacInnis & Page-Gould, 2015; 
McManus, Feyes, & Saucier, 2011; Oliver & Wong, 2003; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & 
Tropp, 2008; Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 2010; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Richeson & Shelton, 
2007; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Schmid, Hewstone, 
& Al Ramiah, 2012; Sibley, 2013; Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006) and 
people consequently generally report more positive outgroup interactions and more support for 
multiculturalism (e.g., Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 
2005, 2011; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). However, multiculturalism is a broad 
concept and, while people may support the general idea, when faced with less ambiguous 
information that is more specific about how multiculturalism can, will, and does happen, and in 
particular how multiculturalism efforts and policies will impact them, groups can experience 
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threat due to perceptions that these efforts and policies promote the welfare of minority groups 
over majority groups (e.g., affirmative action; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Applying this to 
the current examination of reappropriative racial slurs use, if majority group members perceive 
this racial slur use as promoting the advancement of Black individuals compared to White 
individuals, they may perceive reappropriative slur use more negatively and, consistent with 
intergroup threat theory, these perceptions may then function as justification for prejudice (see 
Justification Suppression Model of Prejudice; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) toward Black 
individuals.  
Intergroup (formerly integrated; Aberson & Gaffney, 2008; Stephan et al., 2002) threat 
theory broadly describes the above pattern of effects by which different outcomes associated 
with outgroup advancement, numerical growth in society, or proximity (e.g., negative 
stereotypes, negative contact, ingroup identification, conflict, status) are related to significantly 
greater intergroup anxiety, realistic, and symbolic threats. Each of these indicators of threat then 
predict significantly more negative attitudes toward outgroups, more discrimination, and greater 
support for policies that promote majority group members over minority group members 
(Alexander, 2009; Barlow, Sibley, & Hornsey, 2011; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Cotrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Carvacho et al., 2013; Green et al., 2010; Earle & Hotson, 2018; Esses, Jackson, 
& Armstrong, 1998; Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2011; Onraet & van Hiel, 2013; Riek, Mania, 
& Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Wood & Finlay, 2008).  
Showing empirical support for intergroup threat theory, the dual process model of 
prejudice (e.g., Crawford, 2012; Crawford, Jussim, Cain, & Cohen, 2013; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt 
& Sibley, 2010) tested these pathways using individual differences related to socially dominant 
and authoritarian attitudes. Specifically, the dual process model of prejudice brought together 
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research on right-wing authoritarian attitudes (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) and socially dominant 
attitudes (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle, 1994) and predicted that these variables 
are related, but independent predictors of prejudice. RWA refers to the extent to which people 
believe that existing values and norms in society are important and should not be changed 
(Altemeyer, 1981), while SDO refers to the extent to which people believe that status hierarchies 
are important and should be reinforced (Pratto et al., 1994). Since the development of the dual 
process model of prejudice, researchers have identified symbolic and realistic threats as 
explanations for the differential relationships that RWA and SDO exhibit with the endorsement 
of prejudice. Symbolic threat is a threat to one’s beliefs and values, while realistic threats include 
threats to safety, security, and one’s resources (Stephan et al., 2002). While each of the two types 
of threat, their antecedents, and endorsements of prejudice are generally correlated, there has 
been some empirical support that shows that symbolic threats more strongly mediate the 
relationships between RWA and prejudice, whereas realistic threats more strongly mediate the 
relationships between SDO and prejudice (see Duckitt, 2006). That said, these effects are not 
always consistent. While RWA, SDO, and threat each seem to be valid and reliable predictors of 
prejudice toward social groups, their differential mediation effects are not always consistent with 
the original model (see Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Miller, Sonnentag, O’Dea, & Saucier, 
submitted).  
Taken together, these findings indicate that majority groups experience threat from 
outgroups for a variety of reasons, they perceive these outgroups more negatively after they have 
experienced threat, and they use this threat as justification for their own discrimination against 
the threatening group to reassert their dominance and position in the status hierarchy. This 
discrimination often comes in the form of perpetuating legitimizing myths (see system 
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justification theory; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012), hate crimes (Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007; 
Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006), greater conservatism, more explicit prejudice 
and implicit prejudice toward the threatening group (Craig & Richeson, 2014), lower support for 
immigration/diversity (Danbold & Huo, 2015; Major, Blodorn, & Blascovich, 2016), and as a 
way to reassert control and gain a sense of collective self esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; 
Fritsche & Jugert, 2017; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; see also Downward Comparison Theory; 
Cadinu & Reggiori, 2002; Steele, 1988; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Costarelli, 2009, 2012; and Self-
Esteem Hypothesis; Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hunter, O’Brien, & Stringer, 2007).  
 Intergroup Threat and the Subversive Perspective 
Extending these theories and empirical support for the effects of threat on interactions 
with and perceptions of outgroup members, the current studies examined the role of threat on 
perceptions of reappropriated racial slur use. Previous researchers examined these effects in the 
context of a Black individual using a reappropriated Black racial slur toward a White individual, 
theorizing this may function similarly to the creation of a common ingroup (see the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) because the reappropriative slur use seeks to 
tear down existing boundaries between White and Black individuals. Specifically, O’Dea and 
Saucier (revision in preparation) examined White individuals’ perceptions of reappropriated 
racial slur use and showed that White people generally perceive this use as a term of endearment 
(thus showing that the effects of slur reappropriation can extend beyond just intragroup 
affiliation to intergroup affiliation). Extending these findings, this research then examined the 
role of socially dominant, authoritarian, and prejudicial attitudes on perceptions of 
reappropriated racial slurs. The findings showed overwhelming support for their hierarchy 
defense hypothesis that higher levels of socially dominant attitudes would be associated with 
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significantly more perceptions of threat when a Black individual uses “nigga” toward a White 
individual which would be related to significantly more negative perceptions of the slur – White 
individuals higher in socially dominant, authoritarian, and prejudicial attitudes perceived the use 
of “nigga” by a Black individual toward a White individual more negatively than did White 
individuals lower in these social attitudes. Further, O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) 
examined whether these increases in negative perceptions of reappropriated racial slurs were 
attributable to intergroup threat. Due to motivations to reinforce and protect existing status 
hierarchies, O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) hypothesized that majority group 
members higher in socially dominant, authoritarian, and prejudicial attitudes would perceive 
reappropriative slur use as more threatening, and subsequently perceive the slurs as more 
negative and as a justification for prejudice toward Black individuals. Across five additional 
studies, greater socially dominant, authoritarian, and prejudicial attitudes were associated with 
significantly more negative perceptions by White people of Black people’s reappropriated slur 
use. Further, greater levels of perceived threat by White people were associated with their 
significantly greater perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified (O’Dea & 
Saucier, revision in preparation). These findings are consistent with each of the threat theories 
discussed above. These findings are also consistent with the concept of categorization threat (see 
Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Hornsey, 
Blackwood, & O’Brien, 2005), which states that when people do not identify with a particular 
social category, but then are grouped into that category (as might be the perception when a Black 
individual uses the reappropriated term “nigga” toward a White individual), they experience 
intergroup threat, perceive the interaction more negatively, and may distance themselves from 
the outgroup/outgroup member(s) by engaging in discriminatory or avoidance behavior.  
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The current studies examined these effects experimentally. Participants were presented 
with either a prime that Black individuals presented high threat, a prime that Black individuals 
presented low threat, or a control prime that had nothing to do with Black individuals or threat. 
These primes were pilot tested and are based on exisiting research related to threat (e.g., Bahns 
& Crandall, 2013). Consistent with theories related to social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999) and the hierarchy defense hypothesis, in Study 1 it was predicted that, when primed with 
high threat, White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes would perceive 
reappropriated slur use by a Black individual toward a White individual as more negative and as 
more of a justification for prejudice toward Black individuals. However, in the low threat 
conditition, it was predicted that greater socially dominant attitudes would either be unrelated or 
be associated with significantly lower negative perceptions and perceptions that prejudice toward 
Black individuals is justified because their position in the status hierarchy is not being 
threatened. This previous research provided the foundation for O’Dea and Saucier’s (revision in 
preparation) hierarchy defense hypothesis which is now applied to the current studies: 
Hierarchy Defense Hypothesis: White individuals will perceive reappropriated 
racial slur use by a Black individual toward a White individual as more negative 
and as more of a justification for prejudice toward Black people in the high threat 
condition compared to the control condition which will be higher than the low 
threat condition. It was predicted that this effect would be stronger for individuals 
higher in socially dominant attitudes.  
Extending these findings, Study 2 examined perceptions of reappropriated slur use by a 
Black individual toward another Black individual. No researchers have examined this 
reappropriative use of slurs among the minority group in terms of majority group members’ 
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perceptions. There are competing hypotheses about the relationships between racial prejudice 
and perceptions of reappropriated racial slurs used among the minority group. On one hand, if 
White individuals higher in prejudicial attitudes toward Black individuals perceive the use of 
reappropriated slur use among Black individuals as threatening to their position in the status 
hierarchy, the results should be consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis above, with 
White individuals higher in negative attitudes toward Black individuals reporting significantly 
more negative perceptions of reappropriated slur use among Black individuals in the high threat 
and control condition, but not in the low threat condition.  
On the other hand, reappropriative slur use among minority group members is generally 
described in existing literature as a mechanism for coping with prejudice (see Bianchi, 2014; 
Galinsky et al., 2013; Rappoport, 2005; Spotorno & Bianchi, 2015). Recent research has showed 
that majority group members are generally favorable toward policies that help minority group 
members as long as these policies do not help the lower status group members advance 
(dependency-oriented versus autonomy-oriented helping) in the status hierarchy (see the 
Intergroup Helping Relations as Status Relations Model; Halabi, Dovidio, & Nadler, 2008; 
Nadler, 2002). Such help can actually foster perceptions within the minority group such as, 
“while there is a status hierarchy, this is okay because majority group members help us, therefore 
it is okay that they are at the top of the status hierarchy” (i.e., dependency-oriented helping). 
Further, because there is less possibility for categorization threat (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; 
Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Hornsey, Blackwood, & O’Brien, 2005) in 
Study 2 when a Black individual is using “nigga” toward another Black individual, the hierarchy 
defense hypothesis may not be supported if it is reliant on category threat and participants are not 
in the high threat condition. It is important to note that the difference in the two hypotheses lies 
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primarily in the control condition. The hypotheses of both studies predict that racial prejudice 
would be associated with significantly more negative perceptions of reappropriated slur use 
when participants are primed with high threat, and uncorrelated or negatively correlated with 
negative perceptions of repappropriate slur use when participants are primed with low threat. 
However, as discussed above, the control condition was neither be related to Black people or 
threat. If participants do not perceive reappropriative slur use among Black individuals as 
threatening to their position in the status hierarchy in the absence of a threat prime, racial 
prejudice should be uncorrelated or negatively correlated to negative perceptions of 
reappropriative slur use in the control condition. 
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Chapter 2 - Current Studies Overview 
 Anderson and Lepore (2013), through their prohibitive perspective, contend that all uses 
of racial slurs are negative because “the offensive potential of racial slurs is offensive to 
whomever these prohibitions matter.” (p. 43). On the other hand, Bianchi (2014) identified a 
subversive perspective contending that, while derogative uses of racial slurs should be 
discouraged, slur reappropriation including the affiliative and subversive uses of racial slurs have 
the potential to help individuals cope with and fight against racial prejudice. Very little research 
has empirically tested the efficacy of these two competing theoretical perspectives in reducing 
the use and negative impacts of racial slurs.  
The current studies focused on majority group members’ resistance to the subversive 
perspective. O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) showed that majority group members 
higher in prejudice toward Black individuals perceived a Black individual using “nigga” toward 
a White person affiliatively as threatening, and then used this threat to justify prejudice toward 
Black individuals. O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) showed these effects 
correlationally. However, extending this work, the current studies causally examined the effect 
of threat in predicting White individuals’ responses to a reappropriated Black racial slur 
(“nigga”) used by a Black individual toward a White individual (Study 1) and toward a Black 
individual (Study 2). Further, the current studies examined whether participants’ socially 
dominant attitudes interact with threat condition in predicting their perceptions of reappropriated 
racial slur use.  
Prior to conducting the proposed studies, five pilot studies were conducted to identify a 
prime that significantly increased threat compared to a control prime. While many studies have 
examined the relationship of prejudice on perceptions of realistic, symbolic, multicultural, and 
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other forms of threat from Black people, few studies have experimentally tested the effect of 
threat on perceptions of Black people. Many studies use threat primes related to salience and 
growing size/proportions of outgroup individuals (typically used to prime threat from Mexican 
immigrants; e.g., Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Sigelman & Niemi, 2001). However, these 
primes are less appropriate to the current studies given the non-salient threat of immigration from 
Black individuals. Instead, the current studies used primes based on recent events that have 
sparked controversy between White and Black individuals in the media (e.g., the kneeling of 
Colin Kaepernick; see Stratmoen et al., 2018). Each of these pilot studies are described below.  
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Chapter 3 - Pilot Studies 
 Pilot Study 1 
 The first pilot study sought to find a manipulation of threat that successfully primed 
greater realistic and/or symbolic threat compared to a control condition. A recent event that has 
sparked dissent and outrage on social media was used; Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling during the 
national anthem at National Football League games (see Stratmoen, Lawless, & Saucier, 2018). 
Colin Kaepernick claimed his kneeling was to protest social injustices that Black people face. 
However, people on social media, including United States President Donald Trump, have 
claimed this kneeling threatened both our values as a nation (United States) and individuals’ 
safety due to its ties to the Black Lives Matter movement which some claim to be a dangerous 
movement. Thus, it was predicted that participants who were primed with either a realistic or 
symbolic prime regarding Kaepernick’s protests would experience greater perceptions of Black 
individuals as threatening compared to a control prime.  
 Method 
Participants 
 Recruitment of participants was based on a GPower power analysis for a MANOVA 
(special effects and interactions) with an effect size f2 = .0625, α = .05, power = .80, three 
groups, and two response variables. This yielded a necessary sample size of 158 White 
participants. Because our typical sample on Amazon TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & 
Abberbock, 2016) yields approximately 60% of White participants who complete the entire 
survey, the current study sought to recruit at least 263 participants for the current study. 292 
participants accessed the study on Qualtrics online survey software. 108 of these participants 
were removed because they either did not respond to or indicated their ethnicity as non-White. 
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An additional 25 participants were removed who did not complete the full survey. There were 
159 White participants who remained for data analysis. Of these, 72 were men and 87 were 
women. The average age of participants was 38.94 (SD = 12.06).  
Materials 
Vignettes. Two vignettes were created to prime either realistic or symbolic threat. Each 
of these primes centered around NFL players kneeling during the national anthem. This is a 
recent societal event that has sparked controversy, with many people indicating that they believe 
that Black people are not disadvantaged and the protests are just a way for Black people to get 
economic or political advantages (realistic threat), and many people indicating that it violates 
important societal norms of respect for our nation and for people who serve in the military 
(symbolic threat). The two vignettes are as follows: 
Realistic. “Football is America’s favorite pastime, or it was until the problem of 
kneeling players. Colin Kaepernick, former NFL quarterback, began kneeling in 
2016. Kaepernick stated his reason for kneeling is to protest the existing 
disadvantage of Black individuals in the United States. Ryan Anderson, a regular 
watcher of the NFL stated, “You have to stand proudly for the national anthem or 
you shouldn’t be playing. Black people aren't oppressed. Kneeling during the 
anthem is a call for special treatment for Black people and this will take 
opportunities away from others who deserve them more.” 
Symbolic. Football is America’s favorite pastime, or it was until NFL players 
began to kneel during the national anthem. Colin Kaepernick, former NFL 
quarterback, began kneeling in 2016. Kaepernick stated his reason for kneeling 
was to protest discrimination by White people toward Black people in the United 
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States, and in particular the increased rates of shooting of Black people by White 
police officers.  Ryan Anderson, a regular watcher of the NFL stated, “You have 
to stand proudly for the national anthem or you shouldn’t be playing. Black 
people aren't oppressed. Kneeling during the anthem is a violation of our existing 
values as Americans and challenges the integrity of the American Way.” 
Realistic Threat. Realistic threat was measured using Stephan and colleagues’ (2002) 
measure of realistic threat. The full scale is presented in Appendix A. This measure consists of 
12-items designed to measure the extent to which White individuals perceive Black individuals 
as economically and socially threatening and dangerous. The scale includes items such as, 
“Blacks hold too many positions of power and responsibility in this country.” Participants 
responded on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. Scores were averaged across 
each of the items to generate a composite score with higher values indicating greater realistic 
threat. The reliability was α = .97. 
Symbolic Threat. Stephan and colleagues’ (2002) measure of symbolic threat was used to 
measure the extent to which participants perceive Black individuals as threatening to existing 
values and norms in American society. The full scale is presented in Appendix B. This scale 
includes items such as, “Whites and Blacks have very different values.” This scale was measured 
using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. Items were averaged to create a 
composite score with higher values indicating greater levels of symbolic threat from Black 
individuals. The reliability of the scale was α = .95. 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited from Amazon’s TurkPrime software (Litman et al., 2016) and 
completed the study on Qualtrics online survey software. Participants then completed 
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demographic information. They then read the randomly assigned realistic or symbolic threat 
vignette or were randomly assigned to a control in which they did not read a vignette. They then 
completed the realistic and symbolic threat scales, indicated whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the vignette (and why), and were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results 
 To test whether threat condition would predict different levels of realistic and symbolic 
threat for the realistic and symbolic versus control primes, a between-groups MANOVA 
predicting participants’ self-reported symbolic and realistic threat was used. This analysis 
yielded no significant effect of threat condition predicting the set of dependent variables 
(realistic threat, symbolic threat), Wilks’ λ = .96, F(4, 310) = 1.52, p = .197, η2p = .02. Upon 
examination of the univariate ANOVAs, there was a marginally significant main effect of threat 
condition predicting participants’ realistic threat, F(2, 156) = 2.908, p = .058, η2p = .04; and a 
non-significant main effect of threat condition predicting participants’ symbolic threat, F(2, 156) 
= 2.22, p = .112, η2p = .03. To further test whether the threat conditions were significantly 
different from the control, Bonferroni pairwise comparisons were conducted. These comparisons 
yielded a marginally significant difference between realistic threat and the control condition 
predicting participants’ perceptions of realistic threat such that the realistic threat condition (M = 
3.72, SD = 2.17) was marginally more realistically threatening than the control condition (M = 
2.75, SD = 2.05), p = .058. There were no other significant or near significant effects (ps > .147).  
 Additional exploratory analyses were conducted by coding1 participants’ responses by 
whether they agreed with the prime (collapsed across the realistic versus symbolic prime because 
there were no significant differences in the effects of these two primes), did not agree with the 
prime, or were in the control condition in which they did not see the prime. These codings were 
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then examined to see whether they predicted differences in participants’ reported symbolic and 
realistic threat. Recall, the prime was a post by an individual who does not believe that Colin 
Kaepernick should be kneeling. It was expected that participants who agreed with the prime 
would report significantly greater realistic and symbolic threat. 11 participants either did not 
respond or their open-ended answer was ambiguous about whether they agreed or disagreed with 
the prime and were not analyzed. There were 43 participants who agreed with the prime, 51 
participants who disagreed with the prime, and 54 participants who viewed the control prime. A 
between-groups MANOVA was conducted in which agreement (agree, disagree, control) was 
entered as the independent variable and realistic and symbolic threat were entered as the 
dependent variables. This analysis revealed a significant effect of agreement predicting the set 
(realistic threat, symbolic threat) of dependent variables, Wilks’ λ = .77, F(4, 288) = 10.32, p < 
.001, η2p = .13. Upon examination of the univariate ANOVAs there was a significant effect of 
agreement predicting both realistic, F(2, 145) = 62.32, p < .001, η2p = .18; and symbolic, F(2, 
145) = 21.89, p < .001, η2p = .23; threat. When these effects were probed using Bonferroni 
pairwise comparisons there was a significant difference between participants who agreed with 
the prime (Realistic: M = 4.51, SD = 2.18, Symbolic: M = 5.69, SD = 1.96) and participants who 
did not agree (Realistic: M = 2.31, SD = 1.73, Symbolic: M = 3.21, SD = 1.84) with the prime as 
well as between participants who agreed with the prime and participants who saw the control 
condition (Realistic: M = 2.75, SD = 2.05, Symbolic: M = 3.86, SD = 1.79; ps < .001). There was 
no significant difference between participants who did not agree with the prime and the control 
condition for either realistic, p = .789; or symbolic, p = .223; threat. These results indicate that 
the prime could be associated with greater perceptions of threat for those who agree with the 
prime but not those who disagree with the prime. However, it is important to note that White 
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participants who generally perceive higher threat from Black individuals likely also would come 
into the study agreeing with that prime (i.e., a statement that Black people should not protest 
during the national anthem, that Black people are not oppressed, and that the protest was either 
realistically or symbolically threatening to White people). Taken together, Pilot Study 1 did not 
successfully prime threat. However, the exploratory findings are promising – participants who 
agreed with either the realistic or symbolic primes stating that Black people should not be 
kneeling reported significantly greater realistic and symbolic threat. That said, it could be that 
participants who have a greater propensity to report agreement with that prime entered the study 
with significantly higher realistic and symbolic threat. As such, additional pilot research needs to 
examine whether the threatening prime significantly increases threat or if people who are 
generally higher in symbolic and realistic threat have a natural propensity to agree versus 
disagree with the prime.  
 Pilot Study 2 
 Pilot Study 2 examined the effect of racial prejudice on perceptions of realistic and 
symbolic threat following presentation of the prime versus the control of not viewing the prime. 
Only the realistic threat vignette used in Pilot Study 1 was used in Pilot Study 2 because this 
vignette was associated with greater symbolic and realistic threat compared to the symbolic 
threat prime. The results of the exploratory analyses in Study 1 indicated that this prime may be 
successful in priming greater threat. However, at best, this is only effective for participants who 
reported agreement with the prime (under half of the sample). While the final study samples 
could be limited to just participants who agreed with the vignette and manipulate whether 
participants evaluate reappropriative racial slur use before or after viewing the vignette, omitting 
over half of the sample is not ideal. Therefore, Pilot Study 2 measured participants’ negative 
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attitudes toward Black individuals and then presented them with the realistic threat vignette or 
did not present them with the threat vignette. It was predicted that racial prejudice would interact 
with threat condition such that higher levels of prejudice would be associated with significantly 
greater perceptions of threat generally consistent with existing correlational research showing 
relationships between racial prejudice and perceptions of threat from minority group members 
(e.g., Duckitt, 2006). That said, it was predicted the effect of prejudice on realistic and symbolic 
threat would be stronger for participants who viewed a threat prime compared to participants 
who did not view a threat prime.  
 Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software (Litman et al., 2016). 
Sample size was chosen based on a power analysis using GPower for a linear multiple 
regression, fixed model testing the R2 increase with an effect size f2 = .0625, α = .05, power = 
.80, and 3 tested predictors (ATB, condition, and their interaction). This power analysis yielded a 
necessary sample of 179 White participants. The current study aimed to collect data from at least 
300 participants due to our typical TurkPrime sample having approximately 60% of participants 
who pass all manipulation checks and self-identify as White. A total of 389 participants accessed 
the survey on Qualtrics. 140 participants were removed who either did not advance past the 
informed consent or indicated their ethnicity as something other than “White”. An additional 29 
participants were removed who did not complete the survey. 220 participants remained for data 
analysis. There were 99 men and 121 women. The average age was 36.56 (SD = 11.69). 
Materials 
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 Racial Prejudice. To measure participants’ levels of racial prejudice, the Attitudes 
Toward Blacks (ATB; Brigham, 1993) scale was used. This scale includes 20 items such as, 
“Generally Blacks are not as smart as Whites.” The full scale is presented in Appendix C. 
Participants responded to each item on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. A 
composite score was created by averaging participants’ responses to each of the items with 
higher scores being greater levels of racial prejudice. The reliability of the scale was α = .91. 
 Vignette. Participants read a vignette similar to the vignettes used in Pilot Study 1. 
However, only the realistic threat vignette used in Pilot Study 1 was used because this vignette 
was associated with greater symbolic and realistic threat.   
Criterion Measures. Participants completed the same scales measuring realistic and 
symbolic threat as were used in Pilot Study 1. The reliability for the realistic threat scale was α = 
.97 and the reliability for the symbolic threat scale was α = .94.  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited from TurkPrime and accessed the study on Qualtrics online 
survey software. After providing consent, participants completed demographic information. They 
then completed the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale. This was then followed by a filler task in 
which participants indicated their favorite movies from a variety of categories (e.g., action) and 
noted how much the average person likes the films they reported. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to read the threat vignette or the control vignette without the additional threat 
prime. After reading the vignette, participants completed the measures assessing their realistic 
and symbolic threat. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
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 Results 
 The interaction between racial prejudice and condition (being primed with a threat 
vignette or not) predicting participants’ perceptions of Black people as realistically and 
symbolically threatening was tested. The current study predicted main effect of racial prejudice 
such that higher levels of racial prejudice would be associated with significantly greater 
perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat from Black individuals regardless of condition. 
Ideally, there would be a main effect of condition such that participants primed with threat would 
experience significantly greater realistic and symbolic threat than participants who were not 
primed. However, given the findings of Pilot Study 1, this expectation was tempered. Finally, it 
was predicted that racial prejudice would interact with condition such that higher levels of 
prejudice would be associated with significantly greater perceptions of threat in both conditions, 
but that this relationship would be stronger in the prime condition than in the no prime condition. 
To test these hypotheses, separate linear regression analyses were conducted using Hayes (2017) 
process model 1 for realistic and symbolic threat. Consistent with the hypotheses, there was a 
main effect of ATB in each of these models such that higher levels of ATB were associated with 
significantly greater perceptions of realistic (B = 1.08, t = 20.03, p < .001, 95% CI[0.97, 1.19]) 
and symbolic (B = 0.99, t = 16.33, p < .001, 95% CI[0.87, 1.11]) threat. Inconsistent with the 
hypotheses, there was again no main effect of condition in predicting participants’ realistic (B = -
.19, t = -1.23, p = .218, 95% CI[-0.50, 0.12]) or symbolic (B = -0.31, t = -1.78, p = .077, 95% 
CI[-0.66, 0.03]) threat. There was also no significant interaction between racial prejudice and 
condition found in predicting participants’ perceptions of realistic (B = -0.00, t = -0.04, p = .966, 
95% CI[-0.22, 0.21]) or symbolic (B = -0.11, t = -0.93, p = .352, 95% CI[-0.35, 0.13]) threat. 
Thus, consistent with Pilot Study 1, the manipulation of threat was unsuccessful either as a main 
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effect or interaction with participants’ scores on the ATB. These findings are consistent with 
Pilot Study 1, but are unfortunate given the primary goal of these studies is to identify a 
successful manipulation of threat from Black individuals to use as a prime in the current studies.  
 Pilot Study 3 
 Pilot Study 3 returned to the findings from the exploratory analyses showing a significant 
effect of agreement with the vignette on participants’ self-reported symbolic and realistic threat. 
In Pilot Study 1 it was found that participants who agreed with the prime saying that Black NFL 
players should not kneel during the anthem reported significantly greater threat than participants 
who did not agree with the prime. That said, because everyone was shown the prime prior to 
completing the measures of threat, Pilot study 1 is unable to conclude that the prime increased 
threat in participants who agreed with the prime. Accordingly, in the current study the ordering 
of the materials (i.e., reading the threat prime prior to versus after completing the realistic and 
symbolic threat scales) was manipulated which allowed a test of whether the prime significantly 
increased threat in participants who agreed with the prime, and whether this was exacerbated for 
participants higher in racial prejudice. Therefore, Pilot Study 3 examined whether participants’ 
negative attitudes toward Black individuals interacted with the manipulation of threat (presenting 
the threat prime before versus after completing the measures of threat) in predicting participants’ 
reported levels of perceived realistic and symbolic threat, and the sample was limited to 
participants who agreed with the threat prime. The realistic and symbolic primes used in Pilot 
Study 1 were also combined into one prime which was predicted to be a stronger manipulation 
than either in isolation. Consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis, it was predicted that 
participants higher in prejudicial attitudes would report significantly greater levels of perceived 
symbolic and realistic threat regardless of whether they completed the measures before or after 
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the prime, but that this effect would be even stronger when they viewed the threat prime prior to 
reporting their realistic and symbolic threat due to participants’ motivations to maintain and be 




 Participants were recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software. Sample size was chosen 
based on a power analysis using the same parameters as Pilot Study 2 yielding a necessary 
sample of 179 White participants. The current study aimed to collect data from at least 300 
participants due to our typical TurkPrime sample having approximately 60% of participants who 
pass all manipulation checks and self-identify as White. There were 394 participants who 
accessed the study. However, 162 were removed because they either did not respond to or 
indicated their ethnicity as something other than White. 36 participants were removed who did 
not complete the survey or who failed an attention check. There were 196 participants remaining 
for data analysis. Of these, 40 were men and 156 were women. The average age of participants 
was 38.65 (SD = 12.51). 
Materials 
Vignette. The prime used in this pilot study was a combination of the realistic and 
symbolic primes that were used in Pilot Study 1. As discussed above, these were combined these 
under the assumption that the two types of threat would be stronger in conjunction than either in 
isolation. Specifically, the vignette depicted a White individual, Ryan Anderson, stating that he 
believes that Black people should stand for the national anthem. The full vignette is presented 
below: 
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Football is America’s favorite pastime, or it was until the problem of kneeling 
players. Colin Kaepernick, former NFL quarterback, began kneeling in 2016. 
Kaepernick stated his reason for kneeling is to protest the existing disadvantage of 
Black individuals in the United States. Ryan Anderson, a regular watcher of the 
NFL stated, “You have to stand proudly for the national anthem or you shouldn’t 
be playing. Black people aren't oppressed. Kneeling during the anthem is a 
violation of our existing values as Americans and challenges the integrity of the 
American Way. It is a call for special treatment for Black people and this will take 
opportunities away from others who deserve them more.” 
Realistic Threat. Stephan and colleagues’ (2002) measure of realistic threat was again 
used. However, because the mean and standard deviation for this measure were quite low across 
all of the previous pilot studies, these items were rewritten to be less overt. This measure still 
consisted of 12-items designed to measure the extent to which White individuals perceive Black 
individuals as economically and socially threatening and dangerous. The modified scale is 
presented in Appendix D. As an example of a modified item, the scale originally included items 
such as, “Blacks hold too many positions of power and responsibility in this country.” This item 
was changed to, “I sometimes worry that White people are losing positions of power to Black 
people.” By making this item less concrete (i.e., “Blacks hold” versus “I sometimes worry”), 
participants may experience less suppression in their responses and feel more comfortable 
reporting threat which would hopefully result in a more normal distribution of scores. 
Participants responded on 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scales. Scores were 
averaged across each of the items to generate a composite score with higher values indicating 
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greater realistic threat. The reliability was α = .90. Unfortunately, the mean was similar to the 
mean of the previous studies at 3.43 (SD = 1.73).  
Symbolic Threat. Stephan and colleagues’ (2002) measure of symbolic threat was also 
modified to be less overt. This scale included items such as, “Whites and Blacks have very 
different values”, which I modified (similar to the above) to, “I sometimes worry that the values 
of Black people and White people are too different.” The modified scale is presented in 
Appendix E. This scale was measured using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. 
One item from the original scale, “Blacks don’t value the traditions of their group as much as 
Whites do.” was removed because it was not measuring a threat to White individuals’ values, but 
rather, saying that Black people don’t value their own values as much as White people value 
their own values. Given the current studies were intended to examine resistance to what White 
people may perceive as a threat to their own existing norms, this item was removed. The final 11 
items were averaged to create a composite score with higher values indicating greater levels of 
symbolic threat from Black individuals. The reliability of the scale was α = .95. Unfortunately, 
the mean was similar to the mean of the previous studies at 3.14 (SD = 1.97). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software and completed the study 
on Qualtrics online survey software. Participants first completed demographic information. Next, 
participants completed the ATB scale followed by the movie questionnaire to disguise the true 
nature of the study. Participants then were randomly assigned to either read the threat prime and 
report their agreement (in the current study participants were asked to indicate if they agreed 
with the prime by categorically indicating “yes” or “no” and then allowed the participants to 
expand in a short answer which was not analyzed) and then complete the measures of symbolic 
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and realistic threat, or to complete the measures of symbolic and realistic threat and then read the 
threat prime and report their agreement. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.  
Results 
 Prior to analyzing only participants who agreed with the prime, the interaction between 
racial prejudice and the presentation of the threat prime (before or after completing the measures 
of realistic and symbolic threat) was examined. Consistent with Pilot Study 2, the prime was not 
expected to be successful at priming threat. Realistic and symbolic threat were analyzed in 
separate regressions using Hayes (2017) process model 1. Each of these models predicting 
realistic, R2 = .57, F(3, 192) = 83.14, p < .001; and symbolic, R2 = .50, F(3, 192) = 63.87, p < 
.001; were significant. However, inconsistent with the objectives of the study, but consistent with 
the previous pilot studies, there was again no effect of threat prime presentation for perceptions 
of either realistic, B = -0.27, t = -1.62, p = .108; or symbolic threat, B = -0.18, t = -0.93, p = .354. 
The small effect of threat prime condition was actually opposite of the predicted direction with 
participants reporting less threat (Mrealistic = 3.29, SD realistic = 1.72; Msymbolic = 3.03, SDsymbolic = 
2.03) when the prime was presented before completing the threat measures than after (Mrealistic = 
3.58, SD realistic = 1.73; Msymbolic = 3.25, SDsymbolic = 1.91). Consistent with hypotheses, there was 
a main effect of prejudice predicting perceptions of realistic, B = 1.03, t = 15.69, p < .001; and 
symbolic, B = 1.10, t = 13.76, p < .001; threat, such that higher levels of prejudice were 
associated with significantly higher levels of perceived realistic and symbolic threat. There was 
no significant threat prime condition x prejudice interaction predicting perceptions of either 
realistic, B = -0.15, t = -1.14, p = .255; or symbolic, B = -0.01, t = -0.07, p = .948; threat.  
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 The effects of prime presentation condition, prejudice, and their interaction were then 
tested only for people who agreed with the prime (70 participants versus 125 participants who 
disagreed) that Colin Kaepernick should not be kneeling. Because participants were asked 
directly whether they agreed or disagreed with the prime, these responses were not coded (as 
they were in Study 1) but rather grouped based on participants’ yes/no answers. The two models 
predicting perceptions of realistic, R2 = .42, F(3, 66) = 16.15, p < .001; and symbolic, R2 = .37, 
F(3, 66) = 13.10, p < .001; threat were both significant. However, again, there was no significant 
effect of threat presentation condition for perceptions of either realistic, B = -0.36, t = -1.24, p 
=.220; or symbolic, B = -0.25, t = -0.64, p = .527; threat. There was still a significant effect of 
prejudice such that higher levels of racial prejudice were associated with significantly greater 
perceptions of realistic, B = 0.77, t = 6.90, p < .001; and symbolic, B = 0.96, t = 6.26, p < .001; 
threat. There was no significant prime presentation condition X prejudice interaction predicting 
perceptions of either realistic, B = -0.16, t = -0.69, p = .491; or symbolic, B = -0.03, t = -0.09, p = 
.927; threat.  
 The current study also examined whether people who agreed with the prime reported 
higher levels of perceived threat than did people who did not agree with the prime. Replicating 
the findings of Pilot Study 1, there was a significant effect of agreement predicting perceptions 
of both realistic, t(193) = 10.16, t < .001, d = 1.49; and symbolic, t(193) = 7.19, p < .001, d = 
1.03; threat such that participants who agreed with the prime reported significantly greater 
perceptions of realistic (M = 4.78, SD = 1.53) and symbolic (M = 4.34, SD = 2.02) threat than did 
participants who disagreed with the prime (Mrealistic = 2.66, SD realistic = 1.31; Msymbolic = 2.46, 
SDsymbolic = 1.59). These results indicate that there is a difference in threat generally between 
people who agree versus disagree with the prime, but that the prime does not significantly 
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exacerbate threat in White individuals, even for those higher in prejudice toward Black 
individuals.  
 Pilot Study 4 
Unfortunately, it seems as though White individuals’ perceptions of Black people as 
threatening are not as malleable as anticipated. It could be that, even though there was a filler 
task in between completing the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale and reading the prime/completing 
the measures of threat, indicating their level of prejudice may have affected participants’ threat 
response. As such, in the current study, the prejudice measure and filler task were removed and 
the current study just manipulated whether the prime was presented before or after participants 
completed the threat measures and measured their agreement with the prime. Doing this allows 
the current study to more specifically focus on the manipulation of threat and ensure participants’ 
responses are not being influenced by external factors unrelated to the threat prime. 
 Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited for the current study using Amazon’s TurkPrime software 
(Litman et al., 2016). An approximate sample size was calculated using Gpower for a 2-tailed t-
test with a Cohen’s d of .50, α = .05, power of .80, and an allocation ratio of 1. This yielded an 
approximate sample size requirement of 128 White participants. Because the typical TurkPrime 
sample consists of approximately 60% White participants who pass all manipulation checks, the 
current study aimed to collect at least 213 participants for the current study. There were 375 
participants who accessed the survey. However, 149 participants either did not advance past the 
informed consent or indicated their ethnicity as non-White and were removed from data analysis. 
Eight additional participants did not advance beyond the demographic questionnaire and eight 
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more participants failed an attention check. This left a sample of 210 participants. Of these 
participants, 54 were men and 156 were women. The average age of the participants was 38.23 
(SD = 13.41).  
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure for this study were the same as in Pilot Study 3 except that 
participants did not complete the ATB or filler movie questionnaire. Specifically, after 
completing the informed consent, participants completed demographic information. They then 
were randomly assigned to either view the threat prime either before or after completing the 
revised measures of perceived realistic and symbolic threat that were used in Pilot Study 3. After 
reading the prime (including indicating categorically (i.e., selecting “yes” or “no”) whether they 
agreed or disagreed with it) and the measures of symbolic and realistic threat, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 Results 
 To test whether there was an effect of prime presentation condition (before or after 
completing the threat measures), a MANOVA was conducted with threat condition entered as the 
independent variable and realistic and symbolic threats entered as the dependent variables. This 
test yielded no effect of prime presentation condition (presented before or after completing the 
measures of threat) predicting the set of dependent variables measuring participants’ perceived 
levels of realistic (Mbefore = 3.89, SDbefore = 2.16; Mafter = 3.60, SDafter = 1.79) and symbolic 
(Mbefore = 3.44, SDbefore = 2.16; Mafter = 3.32, SDafter = 2.13) threat, Wilks’ λ = .99, F(2, 207) = .92, 
p = .401, η2p = .01. None of the univariate analyses were significant (ps > .281). 
Next, only participants who agreed with the prime were selected (84 participants versus 
126 participants who disagreed) and the current analyses examined whether there was an effect 
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of prime presentation condition on realistic and symbolic threats in another MANOVA. This 
yielded a significant effect of prime presentation condition on the set of dependent variables, 
Wilks’ λ = .93, F(2, 81) = 3.24, p = .044, η2p = .07. Upon examination of the univariate effects, 
there was a significant effect of threat prime condition on participants’ perceptions of realistic 
threat (Mbefore = 5.72, SDbefore = 1.70; Mafter = 4.92, SDafter = 1.39), F(1, 82) = 13.32, p = .020, η
2
p 
= .06, such that (for participants who agreed with the prime) participants reported significantly 
greater levels of perceived realistic threat when they read the prime before responding to the 
realistic threat measure than after. However, there was no effect of prime presentation predicting 
perceptions of perceived symbolic threat (Mbefore = 5.18, SDbefore = 1.93; Mafter = 4.81, SDafter = 
1.91), F(1, 82) = 2.89, p = .379, η2p = .01. Finally, a MANOVA was conducted to compare 
participants who agreed with the prime to participants who disagreed with the prime on their 
perceived levels of realistic and symbolic threat. This analysis yielded a significant effect of 
agreement predicting the set of dependent variables, Wilks’ λ = .57, F(2, 207) = 79.53, p < .001, 
η2p = .44. Upon examination of the univariate effects, there was a significant effect of prime 
agreement on both realistic, F(1, 208) = 145.07, p < .001, η2p = .41; and symbolic, F(1, 208) = 
124.89, p < .001, η2p = .38; threat such that participants who reported that they agreed with the 
prime (Mrealistic = 5.29, SD realistic = 1.58; Msymbolic = 4.98, SDsymbolic = 1.92) reported significantly 
higher levels of perceived realistic and symbolic threat than participants who did not agree with 
the prime (Mrealistic = 2.71, SD realistic = 1.48; Msymbolic = 2.31, SDsymbolic = 1.53).  
 Taken together, Pilot Study 4 was again generally unsuccessful at priming threat. There 
was a significant effect of prime condition on participants’ realistic threat perceptions for 
participants who agreed with the prime, but this effect was smaller than desired for a prime 
aimed at affecting perceptions of a subsequent use of a slur in the proposed studies. The hope of 
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the current study, based on the findings of Pilot Studies 1-3 that only examining participants’ 
data who agreed with the prime that Colin Kaepernick should not be kneeling (who reported 
significantly higher threat than participants who disagreed with this), not having participants 
respond to the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (a highly overt measure of prejudice) during the 
study session, and using a less overt measure of threat, was that this would result in a significant 
effect of threat prime condition on participants’ perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat. 
Unfortunately, this was not shown to be the case.   
 Pilot Study 5 
 Because the findings of Pilot Studies 1-4 did not show successful manipulation of threat 
or an interaction between threat prime and participants’ levels of racial prejudice, Pilot Study 5 
sought to create a vignette that more strongly primed threat. White individuals who are higher in 
racial prejudice toward Black individuals tend to endorse policies that favor White people over 
Black people, seek to reinforce interracial distancing, and experience anxiety when interacting 
with or being exposed to Black people (e.g., Esses et al., 1998). Further, building on Social 
Dominance Theory, the advancement of Black people should be threatening to White individuals 
higher in prejudice toward the targeted group (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, a vignette 
was created that described the advancement of Black individuals in society and greater exposure 
to Black people in media, society, and the workplace. It was predicted that higher levels of racial 
prejudice would be associated with significantly greater levels of perceived threat in both 
conditions (being primed with the threat prime versus not), but that this effect would be 
significantly stronger when participants were primed with the threat vignette than when they 




 Participants were again recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software (Litman et al., 2016). 
The parameters for recruitment were the same as Pilot Studies 2-3, with the power analysis 
yielding a necessary sample of 179. There were 437 participants who accessed the survey on 
Qualtrics online survey software. However, 179 were removed because they did not respond to 
or indicated their ethnicity as something other than “White”. An additional 31 participants were 
removed because they did not complete the survey. This left 227 participants for data analysis 
who indicated their ethnicity as “White.” Of these participants, 51 were men and 175 were 
women and 1 participant self-identified as “other.” The average age of participants was 39.94 
(SD = 13.85). 
Materials 
 Prejudice was again measured using the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (ATB; α = .93; 
Brigham, 1993). Participants reported how realistically and symbolically threatening Black 
people they perceived Black people to be using the realistic (α = .97) and symbolic (α = .94) 
measures created by Stephan and colleagues (2002) that was used in Pilot Studies 1 and 2.  
Vignette. A vignette was written and designed to highlight the achievements of Black 
individuals and their greater representation in media and other domains in recent years. This was 
designed to incite threat in White individuals who endorse existing status hierarchies and place 
emphasis on pushing outgroup members down in the status hierarchy. The full vignette is 
presented below:  
Black people have achieved many things in the last decade. For example, prior to 
recent years, Black people were almost never portrayed in films as the lead actor. 
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However, from Black Panther to Hidden Figures, Black people are taking the 
spotlight, and a Black actor may even be playing Superman and James Bond 
soon! Affirmative action and diversity initiatives have also increased the presence 
of Black individuals on college campuses and in the workplace by providing more 
access to education and resources leading to some of the lowest numbers of Black 
unemployment in history. #blacklivesmatter 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software and accessed the survey on 
Qualtrics online survey software. They first completed demographic information followed by the 
ATB. This was followed by the brief movie questionnaire used in Pilot Study 2 to disguise the 
nature of the study. Participants then were randomly assigned to read the above prime or not. 
They then completed the measures of perceived symbolic and realistic threat, were debriefed, 
and thanked for their participation.  
 Results 
 It was predicted that racial prejudice would interact with threat condition such that higher 
levels of prejudice toward Black individuals would be associated with significantly greater levels 
of perceived threat, but that this effect would be significantly stronger when participants viewed 
the threat vignette versus when they did not view the vignette. To test this hypothesis, a linear 
regression was conducted using Hayes (2017) process model 1. Participants’ scores on the ATB 
and threat prime condition were entered as independent variables and their reported levels of 
perceived realistic and symbolic threat were entered as dependent variables in separate analyses. 
The models predicted a significant amount of variance in participants’ perceptions of realistic 
threat, R2 = .66, F(3, 223) = 147.24, p < .001; and symbolic threat, R2 = .65, F(3, 223) = 139.98, 
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p < .001. These analyses further yielded a significant main effect of threat condition predicting 
participants’ perceptions of realistic threat, B = 0.34, t = 2.18, p = .030; but not symbolic threat B 
= 0.19, t = 1.22, p = .224. Interestingly, and contrary to hypotheses, the threat prime effect was 
opposite of the predicted effect in that being primed with the threat vignette before completing 
the threat measures resulted in lower threat than reading it after completing the threat measures. 
There was also a significant main effect of racial prejudice such that higher levels of racial 
prejudice were associated with significantly greater perceptions of realistic threat, B = 1.03, t = 
19.98, p < .001; and symbolic threat, B = 1.06, t = 19.94, p < .001. There was a significant 
prejudice x threat condition interaction predicting how realistically, B = 0.28, t = 2.71, p = .007; 
but not symbolically, B = 0.13, t = 1.19, p = .237; threatening participants perceived Black 
people to be. Again, participants’ levels of racial prejudice were associated with significantly 
greater realistic threat in both conditions which was consistent with the hypotheses. However, 
this relationship was stronger in the control condition (B = 0.88, t = 10.77, p < .001) than in the 
threat prime condition (B = 1.16, t = 1.16, p < .001) which was not consistent with the 
hypotheses. Taken together, these results were not consistent with the hypotheses and the current 
study, again, did not successfully prime threat, but rather, attenuated it. In hindsight, these 
findings could potentially be due to our portraying Black people in entertainment venues. This 
could potentially prime perceptions of Black individuals that are consistent with stereotypes, as 
well as the potential that White people could perceive Black people as servants to White 
consumers of media. Each of these possibilities are speculative, but this could potentially explain 




Chapter 4 - Study 1 
Although the findings of the five pilot studies were unsuccessful at inducing perceptions 
of threat, the current research moved forward with data collection on the main studies of this 
dissertation. As was described earlier, the goal of Study 1 was to examine White participants’ 
perceptions of reappropriative racial slur use by a Black individual toward a White individual 
(intergroup use). Although each of the pilot studies used the Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale, in 
the current study a measure of socially dominant attitudes was used. This methodological choice 
was made to be more consistent with Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and 
the hierarchy defense hypothesis (O’Dea & Saucier, revision in preparation). Specifically, O’Dea 
and Saucier (revision in preparation) propose that the reason White individuals might be resistant 
to reappropriative uses of racial slurs is because these may be perceived as ways to affiliate 
across group boundaries, reduce distance between groups, and effectively reduce disparities in 
the social hierarchy. Theoretically, people higher in socially dominant attitudes should resist this 
affiliation and perceive reappropriative slur use as threatening. Extending beyond this, people 
higher in socially dominant attitudes may further report greater perceptions that prejudice toward 
Black individuals is justified following a situation in which a Black individual uses a “nigga” 
affiliatively. Taken together, Social Dominance Orientation is a moderator more consistent with 
motivations to defend the status hierarchy in the hierarchy defense hypothesis. As further 
justification for this methodological change, O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) showed 
more consistent effects with SDO than with ATB predicting White participants’ attitudes toward 
reappropriated racial slur use.  
Each of the pilot studies operated under the assumption that the baseline for the sample is 
a low level of threat. However, as was shown across 5 pilot studies, the control condition 
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generally did not differ from the high threat condition. This is problematic when examining the 
interaction between social dominance beliefs and threat on perceptions of reappropriated slurs. 
With no or little variability, there is no possibility for moderation of social dominance beliefs. To 
address this issue, a third threat condition, a low threat prime, was added in the current studies.  
Although the hypotheses were generally discussed in terms of inducing threat as a function of 
social dominance beliefs, a significant reduction of threat compared to the control or high threat 
conditions would allow the current studies to causally study the interaction between social 
dominance beliefs and threat on perceptions of reappropriated slur use.  
Some recent empirical findings by Bahns and Crandall (2013) support this 
methodological choice. Specifically, Bahns and Crandall (2013) examined the effect of SDO on 
perceptions of negative attitudes toward gay people and varied a threat prime as a control prime, 
a high threat prime, and a low threat prime. At the zero-order level, higher levels of SDO are 
associated with more negative attitudes toward gay people. Thus, Bahns and Crandall (2013) 
predicted that greater levels of socially dominant attitudes would be associated with more 
negative perceptions of gay people in the control prime condition, but that these effects would be 
significantly stronger in the high threat condition, and reduced, eliminated, or reversed in the low 
threat condition. Their findings were partially consistent with these hypotheses. Specifically, the 
low threat condition did reduce the effect of SDO on negative attitudes toward gay people with 
their results showing that there was very little effect of social dominance orientation on negative 
attitudes toward gay people in the low threat condition. However, their results were not 
consistent with their predictions in the high threat condition. Specifically, there was a strong 
effect of social dominance orientation on negative perceptions of gay people in both the control 
condition and the high threat condition and these slopes were not significantly different. Thus, 
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their high threat prime did not significantly impact the relationship between SDO and negative 
perceptions of gay people (i.e., the baseline of threat was similar to being primed with a high 
threat prime), but their low threat condition did significantly reduce this relationship, supporting 
the choice in the current studies to causally test the interaction between social dominance beliefs 
and threat by reducing threat.  
The lack of effect of SDO in the low threat condition in Bahns and Crandall (2013)’s 
study is also consistent with research on helping behaviors and Social Dominance Theory 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Specifically, Social Dominance Theory does not predict that majority 
group members do not ever help minority groups or support minority groups. Instead, this help 
and support is context-dependent. When the outgroup does not pose a threat (i.e., when 
individuals are primed with low threat), majority group members are supportive and when the 
outgroup does pose a threat, majority group members are not supportive (see Social Dominance 
Theory; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
Taken together, the current studies first measured participants’ socially dominant 
attitudes. Participants were then experimentally primed with intergroup threat using an 
intergroup contact theory approach, asking participants to imagine an interaction with a Black 
person that is positive (low threat condition) or negative (high threat condition), or to imagine a 
control situation. Participants were then shown a vignette in which a Black person used a 
reappropriated Black racial slur (“nigga”) toward a White person affiliatively, and participants 
reported their perceptions of the affiliative slur use as negative and as a justification for prejudice 
toward Black people. Consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis, it was predicted that in 
the high threat condition White individuals would perceive reappropriative racial slur as more 
negative and a justification for prejudice toward Black people, but in the low threat condition 
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White individuals would perceive reappropriative slur use as less negative and less of a 
justification for prejudice toward Black people, than when participants were not primed with 
threat. It was further predicted this effect would be moderated by socially dominant attitudes 
with SDO having no effect in the low threat condition (Bahns & Crandall, 2013) and a strong 
positive effect in the control and high threat condition consistent with the hierarchy defense 
hypothesis. This is because, with the reduction of threat, White individuals’ position in the status 
hierarchy is more secure because they are being told that Black individuals are struggling to 
advance in society. As such, Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) would suggest 
that White individuals higher in social dominance beliefs should be more supportive of 
reappropriative slur use when threat is reduced. 
 Method 
 Participants 
 Participants for the current study were recruited using Amazon’s TurkPrime software 
(Litman et al., 2016). Participation was limited to only include White participants. The current 
study attempted to recruit 263 White participants who would pass all manipulation checks. This 
number of participants was based on a power analysis using GPower. The parameters entered 
into the power analysis were an f2 = .05 (which is a fairly conservative low effect size), α = .05, 
Power = .80, with five tested predictors (one continuous IV, two categorical IVs to carry the 3-
level threat variable, two 2-way interactions). Participants were paid $0.25 for their participation. 
351 participants accessed the study on Qualtrics. There were 11 participants who were removed 
because they indicated their ethnicity as something other than White, 47 participants who did not 
complete the entire survey, and 12 participants who indicated they either did not read the threat 
prime or who failed the manipulation check. This left 281 White participants for data analysis. 
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Of these participants, 90 reported their sex as male, 190 as female, and 1 as “other”. The average 
age of participants was 39.54 (SD = 13.20).  
 Materials 
 All scales described below were completed on 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) 
scales. Composite scores were calculated by averaging across participants’ responses to each 
item with higher scores indicating a higher level of the construct being measured. Means, 
standard deviations, and correlations between each of the measures are presented in Table 1.  
Socially Dominant Attitudes. To measure participants’ socially dominant attitudes, the 
Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) was used. This scale consisted of 
16-items such as, “Some groups are simply inferior to other groups”. The full scale is presented 
in Appendix F. Participants’ responses to each item were averaged to calculate a composite score 
with higher values indicating greater socially dominant attitudes.  
Threat Manipulation. Participants were given one of three threat imagination tasks. 
These were designed using previous literature to either increase (high threat condition), decrease 
(low threat condition), or not affect perceptions of threat (control threat condition). To further 
emphasize the effects of each of the imagination tasks above (Husnu & Crisp, 2010), participants 
then responded to prompts that promoted additional thought about the imagined situation. 
Specifically, participants were asked to describe what the person they were asked to imagine 
looks like, what the person is wearing, describe the specific negative event that occurred, and 
describe how that event makes them feel. Consistent with the manipulation check used by 
Harwood, Paolini, Joyce, Rubin, and Arroyo (2011), participants then responded to one item on a 
1 (not at all) to 9 (very) scale indicating how pleasant the encounter/situation was.   
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In the high threat condition participants imagined a negative interaction with a Black 
person in which they competed against the Black person who was attempting to beat him or her 
to achieve a goal. Participants were then asked to think of differences between the Black person 
and themselves in terms of personality traits and values. Participants were then shown a 
statement similar to that used in Bahns and Crandall (2013) to manipulate threat. The statement 
read, “Recent statistics have shown that the number of Black people on welfare is dropping 
compared to the number of White people on welfare which is increasing. Because of this, Black 
people are quickly gaining political leverage while White people are losing political leverage. 
Thus, Black people are experiencing considerable advancements in becoming successful and 
respected members of American society.” Similar manipulations have been used in previous 
research (e.g., Harwood et al., 2011) to manipulate positive and negative contact which should 
predict threat according to intergroup threat theory (Stephan et al., 2002).  
In the low threat condition, participants were asked to imagine a positive interaction with 
a Black person in which they worked together with the Black person to achieve a goal. 
Participants were asked to think of similarities between the Black person and themselves in terms 
of personality traits and values. After they responded, participants read a statement similar to the 
one used by Bahns and Crandall (2013) to attenuate threat which reads, “Recent statistics have 
shown that over 42% of Black people are on welfare. Because of this, Black people have very 
limited political leverage compared to White people and are experiencing considerable difficulty 
in becoming successful and respected members of American society.” 
In the control condition participants were asked to imagine an outdoor scene. This control 
is consistent with Harwood and colleagues (2011) and was designed and has been shown to not 
affect participants’ levels of perceived threat.  
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 Vignette. Participants read through a short vignette in which a Black individual used 
“nigga” toward a White individual affiliatively. This vignette was used previously in research by 
O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation). The full vignette is presented below. The race of the 
individuals in the vignette was indicated by images. The images were chosen from the Chicago 
Face Database to have moderate but roughly equal levels of attractiveness and happiness on their 
faces (see Appendix F; Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015).  
“DeShawn is walking on the sidewalk through town. He turns the corner and sees 
his best friend, David, walking toward him. DeShawn and David high five and 
they embrace in a one arm hug. Smiling, DeShawn says “what’s up nigga” in a 
friendly tone to David. David smiles back and says, “nothing much.” Smiling 
after seeing his friend, DeShawn continues down the sidewalk.   
 Negative perceptions of the slur. To measure participants’ perceptions of the slur as 
negatively expressive by DeShawn toward David, O’Dea and Saucier’s (2017) negatively 
expressive scale combined with their positively expressive scale (reverse-scored) was used. This 
combination has been used by O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) to simplify the 
reporting of results and provide a more comprehensive measure of racial slur perceptions. This 
scale consisted of 8-items which are presented in Appendix G. The positively expressive items 
were reverse-scored and participants’ responses to the items were averaged to create a composite 
score with higher values indicating greater perceptions of the slur as negatively expressive 
toward the target.  
 Justification of prejudice toward Black individuals. Participants’ perceptions that 
racial prejudice toward Black individuals is justified was measured using O’Dea and Saucier’s 
(revision in preparation) justification of prejudice toward Blacks scale. The full scale is presented 
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in Appendix G. Responses to each item were then averaged after reverse-scoring antithetical 
items to create a composite score with higher values indicating greater perceptions that prejudice 
toward Black individuals is justified. 
 Procedure 
 Participants were recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software (Litman et al., 2016). They 
completed the study on Qualtrics online survey software. After providing informed consent and 
reporting their demographic information, participants completed the Social Dominance 
Orientation scale to measure their socially dominant attitudes. Participants then completed a brief 
filler survey assessing their favorite movies from a variety of categories (e.g., science fiction, 
action) and indicate how much the average person likes this movie. This was to distract 
participants from the true nature of the study. Participants then completed the randomly assigned 
low threat, high threat, or control priming imagination task. They then read the vignette in which 
the Black individual, DeShawn, used “nigga” in an affiliative way toward his White friend, 
David. Participants then reported their perceptions of the slur as negatively expressive and 
indicated their perceptions that racial prejudice toward Black individuals is justified. Participants 
were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 Results and Discussion 
Only participants who self-identified as White and who passed all attention checks 
throughout the survey were included in data analyses. Composite scores were calculated for 
participants’ reported levels of SDO, negative expressive perceptions, and perceptions that 
prejudice toward Black individuals is justified by averaging across participants’ responses to 
each item. Higher scores indicate more socially dominant, negative expressive, and justification 
perceptions for prejudice toward Black individuals.  
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 Manipulation Check 
 The manipulation was checked to examine whether the manipulation caused participants 
to report more positive perceptions of the imagination situation in the low threat condition and 
more negative perceptions of the imagination situation in the high threat condition compared to a 
control condition. To examine this effect, a one-way ANOVA was conducted in which condition 
(high threat, low threat, control threat) was entered as the independent variable and participants’ 
perceptions of the imagination situation as pleasant was entered as the dependent variable. This 
dependent item was chosen as the manipulation check based on previous research by Harwood 
and colleagues (2011) who used this item to examine the efficacy of their imagination situation 
to manipulate positive and negative contact with an outgroup member. As discussed in the 
introduction, positive contact has been shown to be related to decreased, while negative contact 
has been shown to be related to increased, interracial anxiety (e.g., Aberson & Gaffney, 2008). 
Consistent with predictions, there was a main effect of condition, F(2, 278) = 127.01, p < .001. 
This effect was probed using Bonferroni pair-wise comparisons which showed that the low threat 
condition (M = 8.38; SD = 0.93) was not perceived as significantly different from the control 
condition (M = 8.15, SD = 1.32; p = 1.000), but both were perceived as significantly more 
pleasant than the high threat condition (M = 4.92, SD = 2.35; ps < .001). These findings indicate 
that the manipulation of positive versus negative contact was successful in priming significantly 
more negative perceptions of the interaction in the high threat compared to the low threat and 
control conditions.  
 The Effects of SDO and Threat on Perceptions of Reappropriated Slurs 
 Regression analyses were conducted using Hayes (2017) process macro model 1. Recall, 
in the current study it was hypothesized that higher socially dominant attitudes would be 
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associated with significantly more negative perceptions of reappropriated slur use by a Black 
individual toward a White individual in the high threat and control conditions, but not in the low 
threat condition (consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis and Bahns & Crandall, 2013). 
This is because when threat is removed, individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes have 
less reason to resist the reappropriative uses of racial slurs because their position in the status 
hierarchy is not in danger. These predictions are founded in Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999) and the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 
2003). Specifically, Social Dominance Theory predicts that majority group members who 
endorse existing status hierarchies who experience threat to their position in the status hierarchy 
will distance themselves from minority group members, be less supportive of policies that 
benefit minority group members, and seek justification for prejudice toward Black individuals 
(Craig & Richeson, 2014; Esses et al., 1998; Hobfoll, 1989; Stephan et al., 2002).  
To test these hypotheses, a 3 (threat condition: high threat, low threat, control) x 
continuous between-groups regression was conducted using the Hayes (2017) process model 1. 
Participants’ levels of SDO and threat condition were entered as the independent variables, and 
their levels of negatively expressive perceptions and perceptions that prejudice toward Black 
individuals is justified were entered as dependent variables in separate analyses. These analyses 
yielded no significant difference between the control and low threat condition predicting 
participants’ perceptions of the use of the term “nigga” by a Black individual toward a White 
individual as negatively expressive, B = 0.10, t = 0.64, p = .523, 95% CI[-0.20, 0.40]. There was 
also no significant difference between the high threat (M = 1.76, SD = 0.82) and low threat (M = 
1.89, 0.98) conditions predicting participants’ perceptions of the use of the term “nigga” by a 
Black individual toward a White individual as negatively expressive, B = -0.18, t = -1.16, p = 
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.246, 95% CI[-0.49, 0.13]. There was, however, a marginally significant difference between 
participants’ perceptions of the use of the term “nigga” in the high threat and control conditions 
(M = 2.10, SD =1.89), B = -0.28, t = 1.87, p = .063, 95% CI[-0.57, 0.02]; such that participants 
perceived “nigga” as marginally more negatively expressive in the control condition than the 
high threat condition. However, this difference was still quite small. To more specifically test the 
hierarchy defense hypothesis, the effect of SDO in each of the threat conditions was examined. 
Inconsistent with the hypotheses, greater levels of SDO were associated with significantly 
greater perceptions of the use of the term “nigga” by a Black individual toward a White 
individual as negatively expressive in the low threat condition, B = 0.21, t = 3.06, p = .002, 95% 
CI[0.08, 0.35]. Consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis, greater levels of SDO were 
associated with significantly greater negatively expressive perceptions of the use of the term 
“nigga” by a Black individual toward a White individual in the high threat condition, B = 0.13, t 
= 2.06, p = .041, 95% CI[0.01, 0.25]; and the control condition, B = 0.32, t = 5.35, p < .001, 95% 
CI[0.20, 0.44]. Interestingly, the effect of SDO was significantly stronger (interaction B = -0.19, 
t = -2.22, p = .027, 95% CI[-0.37, -0.02]) in the control threat condition than in the high threat 
condition, and no other 2-way interactions were significant (ps > .220). Another interesting 
finding is the drastically low perceptions of the use of the term “nigga” by a Black individual 
toward a White individual as negatively expressive. These findings are illustrated in Figure 1. As 
can be seen, even for individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes, the projected means do 
not go above 3 on a 1 to 9 scale with higher scores indicating more negative perceptions of the 
slur. As such, participants generally did not perceive the term “nigga” used by a Black person 
toward a White person to be very negative.  
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These findings generally support the findings from previous research showing that 
greater levels of SDO are associated with significantly more negative perceptions of the 
reappropriated use of the term “nigga” by a Black individual toward a White individual. 
However, these findings call into question the causal effect of threat in explaining these 
relationships. Previous research has shown that greater levels of SDO are associated with 
perceiving reappropriated slur use as more threatening and subsequently more negative (O’Dea 
& Saucier, revision in preparation). Extending these findings in the current study, it was 
predicted that people higher in SDO would perceive the reappropriated use of the term “nigga” 
by a Black individual toward a White individual as more negative after imagining a high threat 
prime, but this was not the case. While previous research has shown that imagining a negative 
interaction with a Black person can heighten animosity toward Black individuals, this does not 
seem to be the case with reappropriated slur use. Instead, it appears that reappropriative slur use 
may actually function to lessen the negative effects of a negative interracial interaction (i.e., the 
high threat condition).  
This possibility was tested further by examining participants’ perceptions of justification 
for prejudice toward Black individuals. These findings are illustrated in Figure 2. As discussed 
above, White individuals’ imagined or real negative experiences with Black people have been 
shown to heighten their negative attitudes toward Black individuals, and this should be especially 
true for White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes. Interestingly, the findings above 
indicate that, while White people higher in SDO are generally more resistant to slur 
reappropriation than people lower in SDO, the reappropriative slur use may function to reduce 
the heightened animosity that typically is shown following negative contact (or imagined 
contact) with a Black individual.  
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There were no significant differences in participants’ perceptions that prejudice toward 
Black people is justified between any of the threat conditions (Mlow threat = 2.23, SDlow threat = 1.56; 
Mcontrol threat = 2.75, SDcontrol threat = 1.77; Mhigh threat = 2.71, SDhigh threat = 1.69; all ps > .074). The 
effect of SDO in each of the threat conditions was examined and the results showed, consistent 
with the hierarchy defense hypothesis, SDO was again related to significantly greater perceptions 
that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified in the low, B = 0.48, t = 5.39, p < .001, 95% 
CI[0.30, 0.65]; control, B = 0.75, t = 9.69, p < .001, 95% CI[0.60, 0.91]; and high, B = 0.56, t = 
6.97, p < .001, 95% CI[0.41, 0.72]; threat conditions. Interestingly, the effect of SDO on 
participants’ perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified was strongest in the 
control condition; it was significantly stronger than in the low threat condition, interaction B = 
0.28, t = 2.34, p = .020, 95% CI[0.04, 0.51]. No other interactions were significant, ps > .095.  
These findings, again, supported previous findings that people higher in socially 
dominant attitudes are more resistant to slur reappropriation than are people lower in socially 
dominant attitudes, and may subsequently increase in their perceptions that prejudice toward 
Black individuals is justified. However, these findings do not support the hypothesis that the 
effect of SDO on perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified would be 
strongest following exposure to a high threat condition and control condition compared to a low 
threat condition. Instead, the effect of SDO on perceptions that prejudice toward Black 
individuals is justified in the high threat condition seems to be more similar to the effect of SDO 
in the low threat condition. These findings are surprising because previous research suggests that 
White individuals imagining or experiencing a negative interaction should not be similar to the 
effects of positive contact (and can even reduce the positive effects of positive contact; e.g., 
Gijsberts, van der Meer, & Dagevos, 2012; Hooghe & De Vroome, 2015; van der Meer & 
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Tolsma, 2014). Thus, it appears that the effect of threat induction on participants’ perceptions 
that prejudice toward Black people is justified may be at least partially neutralized by exposure 
to a Black individual using the reappropriated slur “nigga” toward a White person, possibly 
providing additional support for the subversive perspective that promotes the use of 




Chapter 5 - Study 2 
 Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 by examining White individuals’ perceptions of 
intragroup (i.e., between two Black individuals) reappropriated slur use rather than the 
intergroup (i.e., Black individual toward a White individual) use that was used in Study 1. Threat 
condition was again manipulated as a high threat condition, low threat condition, and control 
condition. Although appearing to be a simple methodological change, the current studies have 
many important implications. Specifically, previous research showed that, even when not primed 
with threat, White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes perceive reappropriative slur 
use by a Black individual toward a White individual more negatively and reported greater 
perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified. These relationships were 
explained by White individuals’ experiences of threat (O’Dea & Saucier, revision in 
preparation). Thus, in Study 1 it was predicted that socially dominant attitudes would be 
positively related to negative perceptions of “nigga” used by a Black individual toward a White 
individual in the control condition. This prediction was based on Social Dominance Theory 
which states that White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes are motivated to 
reinforce, maintain, and keep distance between their group and lower status groups. Because the 
use of “nigga” by a Black individual toward a White individual is generally perceived as a 
positive encounter (see O’Dea & Saucier, in preparation), White individuals higher in socially 
dominant attitudes should be motivated to resist this affiliation in both the control and high threat 
conditions, consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis. That said, in Study 1 it was 
predicted that higher socially dominant attitudes would be uncorrelated or negatively correlated 
with negative perceptions of intergroup reappropriated racial slur use in the low threat condition 
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because this threat would be absolved. These findings were generally not supported; higher 
levels of SDO were generally associated with more negative perceptions of reappropriated slur 
use by a Black person toward a White person, but this relationship was generally not dependent 
on the threat condition.  
In Study 2, it was predicted that individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes would 
report significantly more negative perceptions of intragroup reappropriated racial slurs in the 
high threat condition. However, White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes would 
not report significantly more negative perceptions of intragroup reappropriated racial slurs in the 
low threat condition. Recall, there were competing hypotheses about the relationships between 
socially dominant attitudes and negative perceptions of intragroup reappropriated racial slurs in 
the control condition. On one hand, White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes may 
still perceive the use of intragroup reappropriated racial slurs as threatening to their position in 
the status hierarchy. If this is the case, consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis and 
Study 1, people higher in social dominance beliefs should report significantly more negative 
perceptions of the intragroup use of “nigga” among two Black individuals. On the other hand, 
White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes may not perceive the intragroup use of 
reappropriated racial slurs as threatening to their position in the status hierarchy. Rappoport 
(2005) describes the intragroup use of reappropriated racial slurs as being used to cope with and 
defend against prejudice. If White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes do not 
perceive the intragroup use of reappropriated racial slurs as negatively expressive and as a 
justification for prejudice toward Black individuals in the control condition this would 
theoretically be a result of their perceiving intragroup uses of reappropriated racial slurs as being 




 Participants for Study 2 were recruited using Amazon’s TurkPrime software (Litman et 
al., 2016). Similar to Study 1, data analysis was limited to only include White participants. The 
design of the study was identical to Study 1 except that participants evaluated a reappropriated 
Black racial slur used by a Black individual toward another Black individual instead of by a 
Black individual toward a White individual. The number of participants the current study sought 
to recruit was 263 White participants who passed all manipulation checks. This was based on a 
GPower analysis with the same parameters as Study 1. Participants were paid $0.25 for their 
participation. 366 participants accessed the survey. However, 12 of these participants either did 
not answer or indicated their ethnicity as something other than White, 58 additional participants 
did not complete the study, and 18 participants either indicated that they did not read the threat 
prime or failed the manipulation check. This left 278 White participants for data analysis. There 
were 90 men and 188 women. The average age of participants was 39.31 (SD = 13.38). 
 Materials and Procedure 
 Similar to Study 1, participants were recruited via Amazon’s TurkPrime software and 
completed Study 2 on Qualtrics. After the informed consent, participants completed 
demographic information followed by the Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 
1994) used in Study 1. Next, participants completed the filler items assessing their movie 
preferences and they reported how much the average person likes the movie using a 1 (not at all) 
to 9 (a lot) response scale. They then read the randomly assigned control or threatening prime. 
Participants then read the vignette which was identical to the vignette used in Study 1 except the 
target of the slur, David, was depicted in an image as a Black individual (rather than a White 
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individual as in Study 1). David’s picture was also taken from the database used in Study 1 and 
has been shown to be roughly equivalent in attractiveness and happiness to the images in Study 
1. Participants then reported their perceptions of the slur used by the Black individual, DeShawn, 
toward the Black individual, David as negatively expressive (O’Dea & Saucier, 2017; See Study 
1). They then reported their perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified 
(O’Dea & Saucier, revision in preparation) using the same measure as Study 1. Participants were 
then debriefed and thanked for their participation. The means, standard deviations, and 
correlations among all measures are presented in Table 2.  
 Results and Discussion 
 Prior to analyzing the findings, the data were checked to ensure that all participants self-
identified as White and passed attention checks. The main hypotheses of Study 2 were then 
tested by examining whether SDO interacted with the randomly assigned threat condition to 
predict participants’ perceptions of reappropriated slur use among Black individuals as 
negatively expressive and perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified. To 
examine these effects, Hayes (2017) process macro model 1 was used. Participants’ reported 
levels of SDO and threat condition were entered as the independent variables, and perceptions of 
the reappropriative slur use among Black individuals as negatively expressive and perceptions 
that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified were tested as dependent measures in separate 
regression analyses.  
 Consistent with the hierarchy defense hypothesis, it was predicted that higher reported 
levels of SDO would be associated with significantly more negative perceptions of 
reappropriated slur use among Black individuals in the high threat condition. Specifically, it was 
predicted that White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes primed with threat would 
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be more motivated to perceive reappropriative slur use among Black individuals to be dangerous 
to their position in the status hierarchy. As such, they should perceive the slur use more 
negatively and report significantly greater perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is 
justified than participants lower in SDO.  
 Conversely, it was predicted that, for participants primed with low threat, their reported 
levels of SDO would either be unrelated or negatively related to negatively expressive 
perceptions of reappropriative slur use among Black individuals and perceptions that prejudice 
toward Black individuals is justified. This is likely due to White individuals higher in socially 
dominant attitudes not perceiving reappropriative slur use among Black individuals as 
threatening to their position in the status hierarchy generally, but only when they have been 
primed with threat. By reducing participants’ perceptions of threat from Black individuals, it was 
expected that people higher in socially dominant attitudes would become supportive of slur 
reappropriation as a coping strategy because this is a form of dependency-related support (i.e., is 
not threatening to their position in the status hierarchy) rather than autonomy related support 
(i.e., is threatening to their status position). This prediction is consistent with system justification 
theory (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012) that higher status groups should be motivated to appease 
lower status groups when possible to maintain positive perceptions as a way to justify their 
position in the status hierarchy.  
Recall, however, that there are competing hypotheses about the effects of socially 
dominant attitudes on perceptions of reappropriated racial slurs used by a Black person toward 
another Black person in the control condition. On one hand, consistent with the hierarchy 
defense hypothesis, greater socially dominant attitudes may be associated with significantly more 
negative perceptions of reappropriated racial slur use among Black individuals. In accordance 
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with the hierarchy defense hypothesis, this is likely due to perceptions that this use is subversive, 
intended to reduced status disparities between Black individuals and White individuals.  
On the other hand, White people higher in social dominant attitudes are supportive of 
helping lower status group members in ways that are non-threatening to their majority group 
position (i.e., dependency helping) in the status hierarchy. Thus, if there is no effect, or even a 
negative relationship, between participants’ socially dominant attitudes and their negatively 
expressive perceptions and perceptions in the control condition, this would imply that 
participants are perceiving reappropriative uses of racial slurs among the minority group to be a 
form of coping rather than subversion of the existing status hierarchy. These perceptions are 
similar to the above predictions in the low threat condition but are more likely in that condition 
due to the reduction of threat following the low threat condition.   
Upon examination of the effects of SDO, threat condition, and their interaction predicting 
participants’ perceptions of reappropriated slur use among two Black individuals as negatively 
expressive, the findings showed no significant differences between the low threat (M = 1.89, SD 
= 1.12), control threat (M = 1.81, SD = 1.06), and high threat (M = 1.79, SD = 0.83) conditions 
(all ps > .492) which is not consistent with hypotheses, but is consistent with the findings of 
Study 1. More important to the hypotheses of the current study were the effects of SDO within 
each threat condition. Similar to Study 1, there was generally not a large effect of threat on the 
relationships between SDO and participants’ perceptions of “nigga” used by a Black individual 
toward another Black individual. That said, supporting the hypotheses founded on Social 
Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 2000) and the Intergroup Helping Relations as Status 
Relations Model (Halabi et al., 2008; Nadler, 2002), participants’ levels of SDO were generally 
unrelated to participants’ perceptions of reappropriated slur use among Black individuals in the 
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low threat condition as negatively expressive, B = 0.13, t = 1.93, p = .055; control threat 
condition, B = 0.09, t = 1.56, p = .120; and high threat condition, B = 0.10, t = 1.56, p = .120. 
These findings are shown in Figure 3 and indicate that Black individuals’ reappropriative use of 
the term “nigga” is not perceived negatively as a function of socially dominant beliefs, indicating 
that it is not perceived as a threat to White people’s position atop the status hierarchy. These 
findings have important implications for the subversive strategy for reducing the negative 
implications of racial slurs which will be discussed more in the discussion section.   
The effects of SDO and threat condition predicting participants’ perceptions that 
prejudice toward Black individuals is justified were then tested. These findings are shown in 
Figure 4. Given that this measure is independent of the slur use, it was predicted that the results 
would generally mirror the findings from Study 1, such that participants higher in SDO would 
generally report significantly greater perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is 
justified. This hypothesis was supported such that greater levels of SDO were associated with 
significantly greater perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified in the low 
threat condition, B = 0.65, t = 6.99, p < .001; control threat condition, B = 0.39, t = 4.58, p < 
.001; and high threat condition, B = 0.54, t = 6.02, p < .001. Interestingly, while the results of the 
current study are similar to Study 1 in that higher levels of SDO were associated with 
significantly greater perceptions that prejudice toward Black individuals is justified, the pattern 
of simple slopes across the three threat conditions was reversed. Specifically, in Study 1, the 
strongest effect of SDO was in the control threat condition. However, in the current study, the 
strongest effects of SDO were in the low threat and high threat conditions with the strongest 
difference in slopes between the low threat and control threat conditions, interaction B = -0.23, t 
= -2.07, p = .040. No other interactions were significant (ps > .217). This could be cautiously and 
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speculatively explained by the Intergroup Helping Relations as Status Relations Model (Halabi et 
al., 2008; Nadler, 2002). Again, this model predicts that majority group members will be 
supportive of behaviors and policies that benefit minority group members as well as these 
behaviors and policies do not function to reduce distance between social groups. Specifically, it 
could be that individuals higher in SDO who are asked to imagine a contact scenario with a 
Black person but then are shown a situation in which two Black individuals reappropriatively use 
the term “nigga” among themselves perceive this use as functioning to create ingroups among 
Black individuals but separate from White individuals thus maintain existing group differences 
(specifically pushing the lower status group lower), and thus perceiving the lower status group as 
more deserving of prejudice.   
Taken together, the current study advances existing research and Study 1. By examining 
whether White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes resist the use of not only 
intergroup uses of reappropriated racial slurs (e.g., “nigga” by a Black individual toward a White 
individual), but intragroup uses of reappropriated racial slurs as well (e.g., “nigga” by a Black 
individual toward a Black individual), the current study has provided additional understanding of 
White individuals’ resistance to the subversive strategy (Bianchi, 2014).  Previous research has 
shown that White individuals higher in socially dominant and prejudicial attitudes may resist this 
use of racial slurs in intergroup situations (O’Dea & Saucier, revision in preparation). However, 
it is possible that, in the current studies, these negative perceptions may be constrained to 
intergroup, but not intragroup, uses of reappropriated racial slurs. These findings contribute to 
our understanding of how Social Dominance Theory predicts support for the reappropriation of 
slurs and coping/subversive attempts more generally and furthering understanding the prosocial 
boundary conditions of the subversive strategy – White individuals higher in socially dominant 
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attitudes may be supportive of this use, but only in situations in which it poses no threat to their 
position in the status hierarchy.  
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Chapter 6 - General Discussion 
 The current studies extended previous research on the reappropriation of racial slurs by 
examining the effects of socially dominant attitudes and perceptions of Black people as 
threatening on White individuals’ perceptions of this slur use. Reappropriation of racial slurs is a 
subversive use of racial slurs intended to combat, rather than reinforce, racist social hierarchies. 
Specifically, it is the use of racial slurs by individuals belonging to the targeted social group 
among their ingroup as a means of affiliation and group bonding rather than as a means of 
derogation and disrespect. Extending the hierarchy defense hypothesis and research related to 
Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 2000), it was hypothesized that White individuals 
higher in socially dominant attitudes would generally resist any use of reappropriated racial slur 
use which they perceived as threatening to their position in the status hierarchy.  
More specifically, it was predicted that White individuals higher in socially dominant 
attitudes would be more resistant to slur reappropriation when participants had just been primed 
with a high threat condition compared to a control or low threat condition. Further, it was 
predicted that in the control condition, greater socially dominant attitudes would be associated 
with significantly more negative perceptions of intergroup racial slur use. However, there were 
competing hypotheses about the relationship between socially dominant attitudes and negative 
perceptions of reappropriative slur use in intragroup situations. On one hand, if this is perceived 
as threatening to White people’s position in the status hierarchy, the hierarchy defense 
hypothesis predicted that White individuals higher in social dominance beliefs would be more 
resistant to intragroup slur reappropriation. However, if this is perceived as non-threatening to 
White people’s position in the status hierarchy, the hierarchy defense hypothesis predicted that 
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social dominance beliefs would be uncorrelated with White individuals’ perceptions of 
intragroup reappropriation of racial slurs in the control condition.  
The overarching prediction of the hierarchy defense hypothesis, that White people higher 
in social dominance beliefs would be more resistant to slur reappropriation when it threatened 
their position in the status hierarchy, was supported in both studies. Specifically, White 
individuals higher in social dominance beliefs perceived that prejudice toward Black individuals 
is more justified in both Study 1 and Study 2, and perceived intergroup racial slur use by a Black 
individual toward a White individual as more negative in Study 1. Interestingly, however, even 
White individuals higher in social dominance beliefs did not perceive intragroup reappropriative 
slur use (i.e., the use of “nigga” by a Black individual toward another Black individual in Study 
2) as negative. These findings are consistent with Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999) which suggests that higher status group members are resistant to policies/procedures that 
benefit minority group members in a way that helps them advance upward through the status 
hierarchy but are generally supportive of dependency-related policies that allow groups to cope 
with or flourish in ways that do not promote status advancement. This allows majority group 
members to maintain their higher status position while also maintaining positive and system-
justifying perceptions from minority group members (see System Justification Theory; Jost & 
van der Toorn, 2012). As such, White individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes may be 
supportive of “nigga” among Black individuals. Inconsistent with the specific predictions of the 
current studies regarding externally induced threat, each of the effects discussed above were 
largely independent of threat.  
Taken together, these findings and previous research by O’Dea and Saucier (revision in 
preparation) indicate that individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes perceive 
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reappropriative slur use by a minority group member toward a majority group member as being 
more threatening, more negative, and more as a justification for prejudice toward Black 
individuals. However, consistent with the results of the current research, these effects do not 
appear to be affected by external experimental manipulations of threat. Further, the findings of 
Study 2 indicated that, while SDO was still positively related to perceptions that prejudice 
toward Black individuals is justified, it was generally uncorrelated with participants’ perceptions 
of intragroup uses of reappropriated racial slurs as negatively expressive and participants were 
generally supportive of both types of reappropriative slur use with average negative perceptions 
of this slur use being below 3 on a 9 point scale on which higher scores indicated more negative 
perceptions of the slur. These findings indicate that people higher in SDO do not perceive the 
intragroup use of “nigga” among Black individuals to be threatening to their position in the 
status hierarchy and may suggest that the subversive strategy may have merit in helping minority 
group members cope with prejudice without increasing resistance from majority group members, 
especially when constrained to intragroup uses.  
 Limitations 
 The current studies do have important limitations that could affect the interpretation of 
the findings. First, the studies were conducted using Amazon’s TurkPrime software. While this is 
a highly used method of data collection and has generally been shown to produce similar 
responding to other convenience sampling (e.g., introductory course participants) methods (e.g., 
Kees, Berry, Burton, & Sheehan, 2017), the current research may have lack realism for the 
participants if they either could not imagine themselves in the story, or if they did not perceive 
the situations in which the slurs were used to be plausible. In these situations, the power to detect 
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the hypothesized effects in these studies may be reduced, and the effects that did emerge may 
have less external validity.  
 The current studies are also limited in the scope of threat that was examined. Previous 
research has identified a variety of threat experiences participants may have, including (but not 
limited to) categorical threat, realistic threat, stereotype threat, symbolic threat, and interracial 
anxiety. Each of these could be important in explaining why White individuals were shown to 
experience more negative perceptions of reappropriated racial slur use in O’Dea and Saucier’s 
(revision in preparation) studies. However, the current studies did not directly compare or limit 
the induction/reduction of threat to one of these responses. Instead, the pilot studies, and the 
subsequent manipulation of threat in Studies 1 and 2, were designed to be a combination, rather 
than an isolation of these findings. This methodological choice was due to the existing literature 
on slur reappropriation or slur use in general being relatively scant. Thus, it will be advantageous 
to understand which of these motivated responses is/are affecting participants’ perceptions and 
endorsement of reappropriated racial slurs as well as their subsequent prejudicial responding. 
However, the current studies were necessary to establish the impacts of threat more generally 
first, and future research should further probe the relative effects of more specific forms of 
threat. Interestingly, the findings of the current studies suggest that, while O’Dea and Saucier 
(revision in preparation) showed that threat explains the relationships between SDO and 
perceptions of intergroup uses of reappropriated racial slurs, externally manipulated threat does 
not seem to affect the relationships between SDO and perceptions of racial slurs in either 
intergroup or intragroup uses. Future research could address the impact of threat on perceptions 
of reappropriative slur use by manipulating the intentions behind the perpetrator of the slur’s use 
of the reappropriated term. It may be that more subversive intentions are perceived as more 
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threatening, while more intragroup affiliative intentions are perceived as less threatening, by 
White individuals (especially those higher in socially dominant attitudes).  
 Finally, the current studies were limited to one slur, “nigga”, targeting one social group, 
Black people. These findings may not generalize to slurs targeting other social groups because 
there may be differences in how the groups reappropriated the terms. For example, some social 
groups may embrace and take pride in the stereotypes that are present in the derogative slur use 
claiming these differences between majority group members and their group should be 
celebrated rather than vilified. On the other hand, social groups may reappropriate slurs as a way 
to distance themselves from the associated stereotypic associations if the groups perceive these 
associations as either uncharacteristic or undesirable traits. Thus, based on previous research and 
Social Dominance Theory, it should be expected that majority group members would respond 
similarly in all situations involving slur reappropriation and perceptions that minority group 
members are attempting to subvert existing status hierarchies. However, it is possible that what 
constitutes a threat to the existing status hierarchy may be group dependent or may be 
functionally dependent on how the slur is reappropriated and used.   
 Implications and Future Directions   
The current studies contribute to the growing body of literature focused on reducing the 
negative impacts of slurs toward minority group members. Slurs used derogatively toward 
minority group members have deleterious effects on targets, including negative emotions (e.g., 
fear), negative perceptions of self and group status, lower career advancement, and negative 
physiological symptoms (e.g., Brandt & Henry, 2012; Dodson, 2014; Graumann, 1998; Haslam 
et al., 2011; Henderson, 2003; Jeshion, 2013; Kremin, 2017; Mendoza-Denton, et al., 2002; 
Merskin, 2010; Schneider et al., 2002). Therefore, research examining the possibility of reducing 
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the use and/or the negative power of slurs is important. Although the majority of existing 
literature to this point has almost exclusively examined the derogative potential of racial slurs, 
these terms are not always intended and perceived negatively. Instead, social groups may 
reappropriate the use of these stigmatizing labels causing the slurs to function not only as 
derogative terms, but as affiliative terms as well. It is in this way that social groups reclaim slurs 
(see Rappoport 2005), changing/subverting the original intention to allow these social groups to 
better cope with prejudice. However, research examining the implications of this use of slurs is 
scant. The research that does exist primarily focuses on the benefits of slur reappropriation 
(Galinsky et al., 2013), showing that group members who reappropriate racial slurs previously 
used to target their racial group are perceived as more in control over stigmatizing slurs, report 
greater self power, and report greater group power. Asserting a prohibitive perspective, 
Anderson and Lepore (2013) contend that the offensiveness of racial slurs is part of the literal, 
semantic meaning of the term and this offensiveness cannot be disentangled from the slur, even 
if the slur is intended and perceived positively. It is in this way that Anderson and Lepore (2013) 
suggest that, even though there are potential benefits to social groups reappropriating the use of 
racial (or other group-based) slurs, the costs outweigh the benefits. Even more contrary to the 
empirical findings of Galinsky and colleagues (2013), Anderson and Lepore (2013) do not 
discuss the benefits of slur reappropriation, but rather, contend that any and all uses of slurs 
should be inhibited. Conversely, Bianchi (2014) and Spotorno and Bianchi (2015) contend that 
social groups should be able to reappropriate the use of stigmatizing slurs. It is in this way that 
the social groups can cope with, defend against, and potentially even subvert prejudicial beliefs 
and discrimination.  
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The current studies advance the discussion on each of these theoretical viewpoints by 
empirically testing the efficacy of the subversive perspective at promoting intergroup affiliation 
between Black individuals and White individuals, thereby reducing prejudice. O’Dea and 
Saucier (in preparation) showed that White individuals are generally supportive of 
reappropriative slur use. O’Dea and Saucier (revision in preparation) then extended and qualified 
these findings by showing that White individuals higher in socially dominant, authoritarian, and 
prejudicial beliefs may perceive this use of reappropriated slurs as threatening to their position in 
the status hierarchy and this threat is associated with significantly greater perceptions that 
prejudice toward Black individuals is justified.  
 Extending these findings, the current studies experimentally tested the hierarchy defense 
hypothesis. These findings are consistent with many theories related to social dominance theory 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), including the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (Crandall 
& Eshleman, 2003), Conservation of Resources Theory (Alba et al., 2005), Instrumental Model 
of Group conflict (Esses et al., 1998), system justification theory (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012), 
self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hunter et al., 2007), stereotype threat theory 
(Steele, 1997), intergroup threat theory (Aberson & Gaffney, 2008; Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan 
& Renfro, 2002), the Dual Process Model (Crawford, 2012; Crawford et al., 2013; Duckitt, 2006; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), the 
Intergroup Helping Relations as Status Relations Model (Halabi et al., 2008; Nadler, 2002), and 
Downward Comparison Theory (Cadinu & Reggiori, 2002; Steel, 1988; Fein & Spencer, 1997; 
Costarelli, 2009, 2012). Broadly, each of these theories explain data showing that majority group 
members may experience a variety of different levels and types of threat when they perceive that 
their values, resources, access, status, or other position are precarious. This threat often comes 
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from minority group members being perceived as attempting to disrupt the status hierarchy either 
by being too demanding in their push for equal rights or by simply being more present, more 
salient, and more represented in society. As a result, a number of studies have shown that White 
individuals higher in socially dominant attitudes may lash out against these lower status group 
members as a way to keep these groups in their place. This lashing out often comes in the form 
of explicit discrimination (e.g., the use or support of derogative racial slurs; see O’Dea et al., 
2015), increased prejudicial beliefs and greater stereotype endorsement, and more support for 
policies that either benefit White majority group members or that only benefit minority group 
members through methods of dependency induction (e.g., Halabi et al., 2008; Nadler, 2002; 
2010).   
The current studies provide cautiously optimistic support for the subversive perspective 
which is aimed at reducing the negative impacts of racial slurs by proposing that minority group 
members use the terms in direct contradiction to their original meaning. Consistent with previous 
research, the current studies showed that White individuals higher in social dominance beliefs 
are more resistant to reappropriative slur use in intergroup situations that individuals lower in 
social dominance beliefs. However, even individuals at the higher end of social dominance 
beliefs generally did not perceive intergroup reappropriation of “nigga” by a Black individual 
toward a White individual as very negative, and social dominance beliefs were uncorrelated with 
perceptions of intragroup reappropriative slur use among two Black individuals. Thus, the 
subversive strategy, which has been previously shown by Galinsky and colleagues (2013) to 
increase people’s perceptions of self-power, group power, and perceptions of control over 
stigmatizing labels, may be a strategy that many majority group members support, consistent 
with findings by O’Dea and Saucier (in preparation) that White individuals generally perceive, 
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even intergroup uses of reappropriated racial slur use by a Black individual toward a White 
individual, quite positively.  
Taken together, there may be merit to Bianchi’s (2014) subversive strategy. That said, the 
excitement surrounding this optimism for the subversive perspective should be tempered and 
evaluated critically. Racial slurs are powerful terms and “nigger” has been described as one of 
the most-vile words in the English language (see Kennedy, 2002). Racial slurs are terms which 
should not be used thoughtlessly. Although some recent research, including that reported in the 
current studies, provides empirical support for the subversive strategy, the prohibitive strategy 
has not been empirically tested or compared to the subversive strategy in terms of effectiveness. 
Future research should examine the efficacy of the prohibitive strategy as well as examine the 
efficacy of each of these strategies against one another at reducing the negative use and/or 
negative impacts of racial slurs. Further, there is need for critical discussion of how the 
allowance of racial slurs in society affects public interaction. While reappropriative slur use may 
have positive outcomes, there are many in society belonging to the targeted group who are 
vehemently against the uses of these terms (e.g., Dodson, 2014).  
Further, while existing assessments of the derogative and reappropriative uses of slurs are 
constrained to the use of slurs toward Black individuals or by Black individuals, it is important to 
note that other groups are targeted by derogative group-based slurs and have the choice to 
prohibit or subvert these uses as well. Future research should examine the subversive and 
prohibitive perspectives at reducing the use, negative impacts of, and resistance to subversive 
uses of these terms. Examples of other commonly used slurs toward other groups that have been, 
at least partially, reappropriated include the term “bitch” by women (e.g., “badass bitch”; see 
Stratmoen, Craig, & Saucier, in preparation) and “queer” by the LGBT community. There are 
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some important differences in the reappropriation of these other group labels, however. By 
reappropriating the term “nigga”, the Black community directly refuted the negative stereotypes 
associated with the term (see Kendi, 2016). The LGBT community, on the other hand, has 
embraced the negative stereotypes contending that, ‘yes we have different identities, and those 
identities should be celebrated rather than vilified.’ This is similar to the term “bitch” by women. 
Women who are assertive, in positions of power, or are perceived as either non-emotional or 
overly-emotional are frequently regarded as “bitches”. With the adoption of this term, women 
generally embrace many of the stereotypes asserting, ‘yes we do not fit typical gender roles that 
restrict our involvement in the community to birthing and raising children, and we are badass 
bitches because of it’. There is little research to this point examining the benefits or resistance to 
the reappropriation of these terms. Thus, it is important to examine whether in the current studies 
extend to slurs targeting members of other social groups.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
While the explicit expression of prejudice is generally vilified in modern society, the use 
of slurs continues. The subversive and prohibitive perspectives aim to change existing norms 
about slur use, but in different ways: The prohibitive norm discourages all slur use; the 
subversive norm encourages their positive/subversive use. Social norms describe expectations 
for people’s behavior. However, prior to endorsing either the prohibitive or subversive 
perspectives as prescriptive normative influences, it is important to examine the positive and 
negative effects of each at reducing the use or negative impacts of racial slurs. The prohibitive 
and subversive strategies likely have important implications for race relations, but these 
implications remain untested. Though many tout the complete elimination of expression of slurs 
as a laudatory societal goal (the prohibitive norm), there may be some potential for 
reappropriated slurs to combat racism and promote intergroup affiliation (the subversive norm). 
The majority of existing research on, and theoretical discussion of, slurs is limited to the 
derogative potential of slurs. However, the current studies advance a novel assessment of the 
subversive perspective. Specifically, the subversive norm may allow minority groups to cope 
with disparaging slur use and other forms of discrimination as well as to subvert status 
hierarchies and potentially affiliate across group boundaries (thus creating a common ingroup; 
see common ingroup identity model; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).  
While previous research has shown that threat from reappropriative slur use explains the 
relationships between participants’ levels of SDO and participants’ perceptions of “nigga” used 
by a Black individual toward a White individual, the current studies showed that experimentally 
manipulated threat did not affect these relationships. Further, the current studies showed that 
White individuals are generally supportive of reappropriative slur use with White individuals 
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higher in socially dominant attitudes being somewhat more resistant to reappropriative slur use 
by Black individuals toward White individuals, possibly indicating that White individuals higher 
in social dominance beliefs perceive this as a subversion of the existing status hierarchy. Thus, 
the current studies should hopefully inspire future research on the efficacy of the subversive 
perspective; the intention being that the current studies be used to inform individuals about the 
costs and benefits of discouraging versus encouraging different norms for slur use. Taken 
together, the use of racial slurs according to the intentions endorsed by the subversive 
perspective (Bianchi, 2014) may, indeed, have a prosocial benefit of helping marginalized 
groups cope with prejudice (Galinsky et al., 2013). However, this perspective does not come 
without cost, especially when the terms are reappropriated and used by minority groups toward 
majority groups. Indeed, the very act of seeking to remove hierarchy boundary walls between 
groups via intergroup affiliation may function as one of the catalysts for its reinforcement.   
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Chapter 8 - Tables 
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations between each of the measures used in Study 1.  
Variable M SD 1. 2. 3. 
1. SDO 2.75 1.69 (.96)   
2. Negatively expressive perceptions 1.93 1.11 .35*** (.88)  
3. Justification perceptions 2.57 1.69 .61*** .39*** (.84) 





Means, standard deviations, and correlations between each of the variables in Study 2 
Variables M SD 1. 2. 3. 
1. SDO 2.75 1.68 (.95)   
2. Negative 1.83 1.02 .17** (.88)  
3. Justification 2.55 1.70 .51*** .12* (.85) 




Chapter 9 - Figures 
 
Figure 1. Threat condition x SDO interaction predicting participants’ negatively expressive 



































































Figure 3. Threat condition x SDO interaction predicting participants’ negatively expressive 
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Appendix A - Realistic Threat Scale (Stephan et al., 2002) 
1. Blacks hold too many positions of power and responsibility in this country. 
2. Blacks dominate American politics more than they should. 
3. When Blacks are in positions of authority, they discriminate against Whites when making 
hiring decisions. 
4. Too much money is spent on educational programs that benefit Blacks. 
5. Blacks have more economic power than they deserve in this country. 
6. Blacks receive too much of the money spent on healthcare and childcare. 
7. Too much money per student is spent on education for Blacks. 
8. The tax system favors Blacks. 
9. Many companies hire less qualified Blacks over more qualified Whites. 
10. Blacks have more political power than they deserve in this country. 
11. Public service agencies favor Blacks over Whites. 
12. The legal system is more lenient on Blacks than on Whites. 
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Appendix B - Symbolic Threat Scale (Stephan et al., 2002) 
1. Whites and Blacks have very different values. 
2. Blacks have no right to think they have better values than Whites. 
3. Blacks want their rights to be put ahead of the rights of Whites. 
4. Blacks don't understand the way Whites view the world. 
5. Blacks do not value the rights granted by the Constitution (life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness) as much as Whites do. 
6. Blacks and Whites have different family values. 
7. Blacks don't value the traditions of their group as much as Whites do. 
8. Blacks regard themselves as morally superior to Whites. 
9. The values of Blacks regarding work are different from those of Whites. 
10. Most Blacks will never understand what Whites are like. 
11. Blacks should not try to impose their values on Whites. 
12. Whites do not get as much respect from Blacks as they deserve. 
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Appendix C - Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993) 
1. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. 
2. If I had a chance to introduce Black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be 
pleased to do so. (R)  
3. I would rather not have Blacks live in the same apartment building I live in. 
4. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both Whites and 
Blacks. (R) 
5. I probably would feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a Black in a public place. 
6. I think that Black people look more similar to each other than White people do. 
7. It would not bother me if my new roommate was Black. (R) 
8. Inter-racial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion which 
the children feel. 
9. If a Black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from 
him or her. (R) 
10. Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites. 
11. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices Blacks suffer 
at the hands of local authorities. (R) 
12. It is likely that Blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in. 
13. Black and White people are inherently equal. (R) 
14. I get very upset when I hear a White make a prejudicial remark about Blacks. (R) 
15. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or promotion 
because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. 
16. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods. (R) 
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17. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights. 
18. I would not mind at all if a Black family with about the same income and education as me 
moved in next door. (R) 
19. Whites should support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination and segregation. 
(R) 
20. Some Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them. 
  
99 
Appendix D - Modified Realistic Threat Scale 
1. I sometimes worry that White people are losing positions of power to Black people. 
2. I sometimes worry that Black people are not represented enough in American politics. 
(R) 
3. I sometimes worry that when Black people are in positions of authority, they prefer to 
hire people of their own racial group rather than White people. 
4. I sometimes worry that too much money is being taken away from educational programs 
that predominantly serve White students and is being given to educational programs that 
predominantly benefit Black students. 
5. I sometimes worry that White people have too much economic power in this country. (R) 
6. I sometimes worry that Black people are unfairly prioritized over White people for their 
healthcare and childcare needs. 
7. I sometimes worry that Black students are prioritized over White students for educational 
funding. 
8. I sometimes worry that Black people unfairly receive more tax benefits than do White 
people. 
9. I sometimes worry that many companies’ hiring policies unfairly benefit Black people 
more than White people. 
10. I think that Black people should have more political power in this country than they 
currently do. (R) 
11. I sometimes worry that public service agencies unfairly show preference for Black people 
over White people. 
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12. I sometimes worry that Black people, more than White people, are wrongly convicted 
when put on trial. (R) 
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Appendix E - Modified Symbolic Threat Scale 
1. I sometimes worry that the values of Black people and White people are too different. 
2. I sometimes worry that Black people think they have better values than do White people. 
3. I sometimes worry that Black people want their rights to be a higher priority than the 
rights of White people. 
4. I sometimes worry that Black people don’t respect the values of White people. 
5. I sometimes worry that Black people don’t value traditional American values as much as 
White people do. 
6. I sometimes worry that Black people don’t value traditional family values as much as 
White people do. 
7. Please choose option 7 (attention check) 
8. I sometimes worry that Black people generally think they have better moral values than 
White people do. 
9. I sometimes worry that the values that Black people place on work are inconsistent with 
the values that White people place on work. 
10. I sometimes worry that many Black people have difficulty understanding White people’s 
values. 
11. I sometimes worry that Black people push their values onto White people too much. 




Appendix F - Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto et al., 1994) 
1. Some groups are simply inferior to other groups. 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
6. It’s probably good that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. (R) 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. (R) 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. (R) 
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (R) 
13. Increased social equality. (R) 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. (R) 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. (R) 
16. No one group should dominate in society. (R) 
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Appendix G - Images used in Studies 1 and 2 
 
DeShawn, the Black perpetrator in Studies 1-2.  
 
David, the White target in Study 1. 
 
David, the Black target in Study 2. 
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Appendix H - Negatively Expressive Perceptions 
1. DeShawn used this term in a friendly way toward David. (R) 
2. This term was used by DeShawn to bond with David. (R) 
3. DeShawn used this term because he thought that it would show David that they could be 
friends. (R) 
4. DeShawn was trying to be nice to David. (R) 
5. This term was used to express negative emotion toward David. 
6. This term was meant to insult David. 
7. DeShawn said this to hurt David’s feelings. 
8. DeShawn used this term to get David angry. 
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Appendix I - Justification of Prejudice toward Black Individuals 
1. Negative stereotypes about Blacks are justified. 
2. Prejudice toward Blacks is justified. 
3. Discrimination against Blacks is justified. 
4. Negative stereotypes about Blacks should not be expressed. 
5. Prejudice toward Blacks should not be expressed. 
6. Discrimination against Blacks should not be expressed. 
 
 
